ON INSURGENCY

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Conflict, Security, and Development

by

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How might Unified Action partners better understand the multifarious complexities of insurgencies? Practitioners must think more deeply about the arrangements, alliances, internal conflicts, ideologies, and parastatal relationships that emerge, morph and subside in an insurgency. Prevailing definitions are insufficient and military frameworks lend themselves to a false perception of a holistic understanding of intrastate conflict environments. Challenging this condition, this thesis argues that insurgencies are a diverse amalgamation of local and supralocal dynamics that shape the patterns of domestic and international politics and, therefore, require a new definition and a unique framework for analysis. This paper creates and develops the Insurgency Analysis framework, integrating cutting edge political science concepts, to facilitate the applied understanding of insurgency in a better way. To demonstrate the relevance, scalability, and contextual portability of this new framework, it is further applied to the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria. Furthermore, this new definition and new framework have institutional implications for Unified Action partners in that it assists in disaggregating the study of insurgency and accentuates the many complex factors one must consider with regard to policy formulation and collective action.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ON INSURGENCY, by Major Anthony B. Aguilar, 124 pages.

How might Unified Action partners better understand the multifarious complexities of insurgencies? Practitioners must think more deeply about the arrangements, alliances, internal conflicts, ideologies, and parastatal relationships that emerge, morph and subside in an insurgency. Prevailing definitions are insufficient and military frameworks lend themselves to a false perception of a holistic understanding of intrastate conflict environments. Challenging this condition, this thesis argues that insurgencies are a diverse amalgamation of local and supralocal dynamics that shape the patterns of domestic and international politics and, therefore, require a new definition and a unique framework for analysis. This paper creates and develops the Insurgency Analysis framework, integrating cutting edge political science concepts, to facilitate the applied understanding of insurgency in a better way. To demonstrate the relevance, scalability, and contextual portability of this new framework, it is further applied to the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria. Furthermore, this new definition and new framework have institutional implications for Unified Action partners in that it assists in disaggregating the study of insurgency and accentuates the many complex factors one must consider with regard to policy formulation and collective action.

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You know how it is. You read a book, flip to the acknowledgments, and find that, once again, the author has dedicated their work to someone else and not to *you*. Not this time. Because we . . .

Haven't yet met – those who may read this, and those who may not,

Have only a glancing acquaintance – *fellow scholars,*

Are just crazy about each other – *my wonderful wife,*

Haven't seen each other in much too long – *my dear friends,*

Are in some way related – *my loving family,*

May never meet in this mortal world, but, despite that, always think fondly of each other – *God,*

This one's for you.

Also, to America, for all that she is, and all that she may become.

Finally, to The Professor, without whose never-failing judgment and encouragement this thesis would have been finished in half the time. A World of becoming is a beautiful World indeed.

●De Oppresso Liber●

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ACRONYMS

ADP        Army Doctrinal Publication

ADRP       Army Doctrinal Reference Pamphlet

ASCOPE     Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events

CALL       Center for Army Lessons Learned

FIE        Full Incorporation Equilibrium

FM         Field Manual

IA         Insurgency Analysis (IA framework)

IAC        Insurgency Analysis Considerations

ICAF       Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

IED        Improvised Explosive Device

JIPOE      Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

JOPP       Joint Operations Planning Process

JP         Joint Publication

MWC        Minimum Winning Coalition (theory)

OE         Operational Environment

PIE        Partial Incorporation Equilibrium

PMESII     Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information

R&S PCC    Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee

SFE        State Failure Equilibrium

SVBIED     Suicide Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device

U.S.       United States

ULO        Unified Land Operations

# ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

<u>The Nature of Contemporary Insurgency</u>

> Well, I'm going to get a little philosophic with you here, but when you look at what the military instrument of power can accomplish, it is actually more effective in dealing with strength-on-strength situations than it is in dealing with strength-on-weakness scenarios. And we're finding that *a weakening of structures and central authority is pervasive in today's world*. Frankly, it's harder to articulate the proper use of military power in that environment as opposed to a world with stronger centers of authority.
> — General Martin E. Dempsey, *Defense One*

In a time when volatile insurgencies rage throughout the world amidst weakening centers of nation state authority, accounting for over 75 percent of militarized disputes since 1945 (Betz 2007; Cleveland and Farris 2013), every continent, every religion, every race, and nearly every country is directly involved in, or directly affected by, intrastate conflict (Pearlman and Cunningham 2011). The tumultuous dynamics between insurgents and incumbents make determining clear outcomes, identifying distinct camps, and communicating indelible objectives a confounding apparition, so much that the United States has become painfully absorbed within the quotidian ties that bridge the dynamic social and political interactions of intrastate conflicts. Owing to the ever-increasing complexity of this reality, Unified Action partners have sought to gain a better understanding of the multifarious environments in which they find themselves, in order to draw assumptions of how intervention will secure a desired set of conditions toward a predicted outcome (Mosser 2010).

In a distinctive style, the U.S. military utilizes multiple linear frameworks to expand familiarity of the operational environment (OE) and build collective knowledge

in the planning process. This work argues that although the importance of awareness, context, and familiarity should never be disregarded, knowledge alone will not lead one to understanding the local dynamics of insurgencies. Rather than separating the historical underpinnings of an analyzed event to categorize it into a model, Unified Action partners must strive to carefully isolate events, specifically insurgencies for the purposes of this argument, while retaining its fullest meaning within the operational environment frame.

In order to do so, Unified Action partners need an integrated systems based framework to analyze insurgency from onset to outcome. Unified Action partners, not unlike any trained professional seeking to understand the connotations of their endeavors, are profoundly invested in the nature of conflict and, therefore, must consider the abundance of theories that elucidate why insurgencies exist, when they mobilize, how they organize, and to what extent actions and decisions impact the nature of war's ends. Indeed, recent history abounds with examples of high intensity intrastate wars that do not create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution through decisive action (Department of the Army 2012b). More often, contemporary conflicts putresce into intrastate conflicts fueled by labyrinthine insurgencies, as witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan.[1]

## Embrace Uncertainty

Uncertainty, in a loose narration of General Stanley McChrystal's style, is a "wicked" problem in planning. Imperfect knowledge and the pressure to develop a plan or determine a solution often results in prematurely ill-conceived choices ranging from

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[1] 'Iraq and Afghanistan' refer to Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2011) and Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-ongoing).

disastrous foreign policy to calamitous tactical operations, to include everything in between. In terms of where Unified Action partners fit within the world of McChrystal's wicked problems, the systems and procedures we use in planning to support mission accomplishment is the science of control (Department of the Army 2012b). Thus, in an idiomatic sense, we are scientists. As Unified Action partners, we study, we observe, we ruminate, and we analyze. Yet, we also act, intervene, inform, assist, and advise. Our laboratory–the operational environment; our tools–the methods in which we plan; our results–uncertain.

With respect to Unified Land Operations and the collective efforts of Unified Action partners, we execute decisive operations quite well. However, we fail to plan for sustainable settlements, which often become the primary catalyst for future conflict in the form of civil war (Rose 2010). Furthermore, nations with an abundance of resources often lack rigor in their analysis leading to poor decisions with regard to conflict intervention and resolution (Rose 2010). Understanding and addressing this aspect is the foundation of this argument and the purpose of the work.

To be clear up front, I am not advocating for chimerical plans anchored in lofty theory. On the contrary, our understandings must be clear and concise, and our deductions must be relevant and applicable. I argue that the bridge between ignorance and doubt is the laborious study of that which is multifarious and dynamic, often in ways that are complex and difficult. This is the reality of future conflict. Seemingly disparate factions and diametrically opposed interests are intersecting in ways never before imagined, and the roles of these actors are forcing the world to seek new approaches to conflict management and resolution.

Research Area of Study

Not all insurgencies are the same, and there is analytical value in distinguishing

between the types of insurgency we find ourselves studying. An uncontestable list of

insurgency goals and typologies does not exist, but common and accepted references

include revolutionary,[2] reformist,[3] separatist,[4] resistance,[5] and commercialist[6] goals;

organized politically, militarily, or as urban-cellular networks. In my argument, I posit

that insurgencies are best understood by focusing on the multilevel complexities,

spiraling emergent properties, multiple causal stories, narratives, and political language,

rather than a predetermined goal or typology. However, for Unified Action partners,

communicative language is necessary.

To further scope this argument, by insurgency, I specifically mean the dynamic

nature of insurgent-incumbent contestation within the context of a recognized, sovereign

state. With regards to a concise definition, this work offers an entirely new definition of

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[2]Revolutionary insurgencies seek to replace the existing political order with an entirely different system, often entailing transformation of the economic and social structures (Central Intelligence Agency 2012, 3).

[3]Reformist insurgencies do not aim to change the existing political order but, instead, seek to compel government to alter its policies or undertake political, economic, or social reforms (Central Intelligence Agency 2012, 3).

[4]Separatist insurgencies seek independence for a specific region. In some cases, the region in question spans existing national boundaries (Central Intelligence Agency 2012, 3).

[5]Resistance insurgencies seek to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a given territory (Central Intelligence Agency 2012, 3).

[6]Commercialist insurgencies are motivated by the acquisition of wealth or material resources; political power is simply a tool for seizing and controlling access to wealth (Central Intelligence Agency 2012, 3).

insurgency as part the critical analysis of this study. This work does not aim to study civil war in its aggregate, the distinct components of irregular warfare, insurgency tactics, or counterinsurgency. These aspects are better left to future study, as an expansion of this work. Moreover, I choose to incorporate the role of structural and institutional causal narratives (logics) as complementary interpretations of individual and group action. First, this directs attention to the phenomenon of "what causes what," or the significant deduction Unified Action planners seek to expose. Second, bounding the reasons for behavior, decisions, and actions clarifies the complex roadmap of explanations sought through analysis.

It is intuitive to suppose that insurgencies begin, are fought with a consistent set of aims, and end in either victory or defeat (Bose 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). For example, in multiparty insurgencies, one would expect the political aims to unify insurgent factions throughout conflict (i.e. the movement) and those insurgent groups will always ally with other insurgent groups in opposition to the state (Christia 2012). This is rarely the case. An initial mass mobilization may become segmented and fragmented, thereby dissolving and fracturing further into multifarious orders, characterized by vacillating intra-insurgency relationships and incumbent-insurgent arrangements. Thus, at one extreme, an insurgency may appear to be one organization; at the other, vast arrays of groups and subgroups consisting on various shared identities and goal orientations (Parkinson 2013). From this, we see that in reality, insurgencies are not consistent, therefore current definitions and current frameworks are incomplete and problematic.

Research Aim and Objectives

By demonstrating the value of scholarly, ontologically based theories for use in analysis, this thesis accomplishes three objectives. First, the argument concludes that linear frameworks are useful and established methods to assist Unified Action partners in the planning process as mechanisms for data collection and organization that assist in building context and common knowledge. However, military frameworks are not sufficient analytical tools to appreciate and scrutinize the many complexities of insurgencies. Second, this work provides an extensive theory foundation to expand our understanding of insurgency, considering the multilevel complexities and spiraling emergent properties throughout. From this, we come to appreciate that not all deductions are linear, or even intuitive. In turn, we find that most determinations made about any aspect of an insurgency will be hard earned, require collective rumination, will likely be counterintuitive, and challenge our notion as to what assuredly can be "determined." As a result, this work provides a "new definition of insurgency." Third, this work presents and follows the general analytical orientation of the Insurgency Analysis (IA) framework, a theory based system of assumptions, concepts, dynamics and complexities that constitutes a way of viewing and analyzing insurgency. Finally, through the lens of contemporary conflict as a plausibility probe, this new framework is proven to be applicable, scalable, and relevant as a planning tool for disaggregating the study of insurgency. By applying a process founded on deeply developed theories to explore the components of complex environments, Unified Action partners can ultimately produce holistic, ontologically based, testable courses of action and policy advisory options,

which is the chief goal of this work. Furthermore, it specifically evaluates the analytical approach methodology of insurgency conflict operational environments.

The supplementary aim of this work is to think about the logic of behavior and choices, and the associated outcomes generated by actors in an insurgency, not necessarily in terms of what we determine "will" happen, but that what we learn "can" happen. The IA framework approach further enables Unified Action partners to use the already proven contextual military frameworks collectively, in order to further develop broader and deeper courses of action that can be scrutinized through experimental action. Therefore, I must demonstrate, convincingly, that a particular set of perspectives is influential for the way we understand insurgency. The burden is on me to show that causal stories, emergent dynamics, and political relationships shape and transform insurgencies.

This essay proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 complicates and motivates the subject of insurgency and identifies significant gaps in existing military frameworks and intrastate conflict theories. Chapter 3 provides an explanation of my methodology, while in section chapter 4 I unpack the IA framework and explain the systematic process for insurgency analysis. I then apply and test the IA framework in a highly contentious, contemporary intrastate conflict arena. Finally, I offer policy implications and recommendations for the application of this framework in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

> Every insurgency is local. Therefore, every counterinsurgency has to be local. And you've got to understand the dynamics of each village and city . . . you know, we fought in Afghanistan for seven years in seven one-year increments, but the fact is that we didn't capture–we didn't develop the sufficiently granular understanding of the areas, and that is what this all depends on.
> — General David Petraeus, *Center for a New American Security*

Suggestions and recommendations from senior civilian and military leadership within the last decade point to a need for Unified Action partners to be well versed in not only the literature of their field, but also in the social and political sciences (Cleveland and Farris 2013; Mosser 2010; Kendall 2008). There has been much discussion as to how the rich body of theories and scholarly research can be implemented into the planning process in order to elucidate the practitioner's world (Cleveland and Farris 2013). What appears to be lacking is not the acknowledgement, or even the initiative, but the conceptual framing of applicable theories into specific aspects of the operations process. This work addresses that gap.

The following review of relevant literature serves to identify significant gaps in intrastate conflict theories, as well as existing military frameworks. Such gaps will be identified, scrutinized, and applied in this body of work, whereas insurgency will serve as the model of the dynamic environment I aim to unpack and elucidate. The contemporary world stage is brimming with deeply contested domestic socio-political environments fecund for insurgency, and it is striking to note that the most prominent form of violent conflict in the world today occurs within states rather than between them (Pearlman and

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Cunningham 2011). Therefore, it is imperative that Unified Action partners have the means to collectively analyze this complex and contentious environment.

<u>The Study of Insurgency in Context</u>

Contemporary insurgent organizations are controlling "larger swaths of territory and expanding their military capability to the point that they could undertake larger operations" (Metz 2007), and are modeling their organizational structure after current successful business corporations. Insurgent groups and subgroups are also adopting the same business practices as corporations, such as alliances and arrangements, forming strategic parastatal relationships, reorganizing for greater effectiveness and efficiency, advertising and creating brand identity, and accumulating and expending capital, just to name a few (Metz 2007). These practices help insurgencies to "maximize desired effects while minimizing cost and risk" (Metz 2007). This new approach allows insurgency organizations to feel less pressured to achieve an overall victory. Instead, they desire to control the internal conflict by establishing themselves as a long-lasting opposition force as an enduring rivalry to the incumbent (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).

Furthermore, recent literature shows that many insurgencies are not revolutionary in nature nor does there exist a unifying "insurgent tactic" to accomplish their objectives (Beckett 2005; Beckerman 1999). Terrorism, which has become the highlight in media parlance, is but one tool used by insurgencies to achieve an effect. Therefore, defeating an insurgency movement will require more than just using military force; it will require a new and bold thought process on the part of decision makers and military strategists, and the collective body of Unified Action partners.

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Although no effort in the existing litany of military methods provides a specific framework for the study of the aforementioned contemporary insurgency complexities, a gap this work will address, the variety of frameworks already in use have substantial bearing on building and framing the collection of planning facts essential to utilizing the IA framework (Department of the Army 2012a; Department of the Army 6-0 2012b). Built on a foundation of contemporary scholarship and intrastate conflict theories, the IA framework applies diverse literature to disaggregate the arrangements, alliances, internal conflicts, ideologies, and parastatal relationships at hand in an insurgency at onset, throughout conflict, and within the potential outcomes.

<p style="text-align:center">Existing Frameworks Fall Short</p>

The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), which is an adaptation of the U.S. Army's analytical approach to problem solving (Department of the Army 2012a), consists of eight steps with a myriad of subordinate processes that all contribute to the problem solving methodology, while in a Joint environment planners use a similar process known as the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). Regardless of which process planners use, the second step of the method is Mission Analysis, which allows the commander to begin his battlefield visualization, resulting in defining the problem and beginning the process of determining feasible solutions (Department of the Army 2012a). While working through the 17 steps of Mission Analysis, planners utilize several frameworks to assemble collections of planning facts to build context and familiarity, such as PMESII and ASCOPE.[7]

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[7]PMESII stands for Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure. Some military personnel prefer another tool, known as ASCOPE, to define

In the context of PMESII and ASCOPE, military planners use the frameworks to organize observed input in order to ascertain a greater understanding. Users seek input for the model under the assumption that "simple additions of the interactions . . . between agents" will elucidate a greater understanding of the environment (Beckerman 1999). Additionally, once a planner classifies data under one of the categories and illustrates the relationship that the information has with other data points throughout the model, such as the PMESII matrix juxtaposed with ASCOPE in a data point crosswalk, the variables still remain static. For example, a Western definition of the "Political" component of PMESII may conflict directly with the definition of those within the observed system (Henderson and Singer 2000). However, military practitioners do not redefine or rename the Political component of the model (Department of the Army 2012a; Department of the Army 2012b). The model and its components remain static and drive framing of an environment rather than the environment driving the analysis to then formulate new points of inquiry and further analysis.

In regard to contextual knowledge organization, PMESII enjoys much more utility as categorical construct. Using the grassroots and bottom up methodologies, military practitioners seek to define smaller and independent aspects of an environment, classify the data points into categories, explore relationships, and subsequently garner a greater understanding. FM 3-0 admits that "human societies are very complicated and

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an operational environment. ASCOPE stands for Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events. U.S. Army Field Manuals 5-0, 3-0, and even 5-2 Design advocate PMESII and ASCOPE as methodologies to ascertain a better understanding of an environment. Furthermore, these methods are generally categorized as sub steps to a larger process. For example, according to FM 5-0, one can use PMESII during the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process which consists of four additional steps and is a part of the larger Military Decision Making Process.

defy precise 'binning'" but utilizing PMESII can "help describe each operation's context for commanders and other leaders" (Department of the Army 2008a). The overall argument of this work does not disagree with the premise of the Operations manual. However, context does not equal understanding. It is the understanding function that this work aims to elucidate.

From a military perspective, one can certainly appreciate the need to conduct a comprehensive, thorough assessment of the Operational Environment. However, the aforementioned linear frameworks do not provide the granularity and complexity required to achieve holistic understanding of fundamentally dynamic and multifarious environments. In a further attempt for full disclosure, ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, does acknowledge the disadvantage of the MDMP and the subsequent frameworks. Nonetheless, if one were to expect an admission of foible as to the MDMP not possessing the components of a holistic approach to problem solving for all conflict environments, you will only find an apathetic claim that using the laborious process is a time-consuming endeavor (Department of the Army 2012a). While this is certainly true in most cases, though not always a disadvantage, I further push the hubris of the MDMP by arguing that it is incapable of scrutinizing and unpacking the complex, difficult, and sometimes perplexing dynamics of insurgencies not as a fault of the process, but in the frameworks it currently lacks. Therefore, I aim to augment and expand the process with a specific, ontologically based, holistic framework for the analysis of insurgencies in order to better understand the complexities that Unified Action partners aim to understand.

In turn, other military practitioners who have studied conceptually complex insurgency structures have appreciated the living nature of its study (Kendall 2008).

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Recent exciting works in the literature underline the use of military, political, social, and economic elements as a living system, noting convergence around these dimensions as subsystems (Kendall 2008; Beckerman 1999; Cleveland and Farris 2013). Despite the instrumentality in the lucidity of local cleavages that this approach allows in the descriptions and definitions it provides, it precariously presupposes an objective perception of a general insurgency structure that is incomplete, narrow, and in most cases, not applicable. This perceived insurgency structure is in turn considered to impose constraints on the composition of an insurgency in general terms, while only applying one tactic as the unifying system–the use of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and the subsystems of an IED cell (Kendall 2008).

Empirically, however, a singular insurgent tactical approach does not prove to be objective, general, or unifying. Rather, this approach is narrow and understood in a very particular functional context of potential insurgent tactics. Specifically, the argument I am making toward the understanding of insurgency in the justification of multilevel complexities, emergent properties, and multiple causal stories builds off the living systems approach, but avoids applying this concept to one specific tactic or insurgent subgroup system as a generally unifying element.

In October 2008, an interagency working group, formed under the auspices of the Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee (R&S PCC), adopted the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) as the conceptual tool which informs interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation and stabilization (Department of State 2008). The framework requires participants to move through a process that consists of two major components: Conflict Diagnosis and Segue into

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Planning. Segue into Planning is the second component and is only conducted when the

ICAF is undertaken to support U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization crisis

response or contingency planning. In each component there consist several subordinate

steps with each step having subsequent tasks to accomplish. The primary steps of

Conflict Diagnosis are:

1. Context;

2. Understand Core Grievances and Sources of Social and Institutional Resilience;

3. Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors; and

4. Describe Opportunities for Increasing Conflict and Opportunities for
   Decreasing Conflict (Department of State 2008).

The framework also states in its purpose that supplementary documents will be

developed to "provide a fuller treatment of the analytical framework, appropriate tools

and data collection methods, and the composition and functioning of an assessment team"

(Department of State 2008). The framework appreciates what is known as a soft system

approach but it appears to be incomplete since it lacks multiple perspectives when

gathering and analyzing the data collected from the list of questions within the

framework. These diverse outlooks are critical to gaining a more holistic understanding

of the dynamics being observed. The ICAF further lacks any type of organizing reference

tool in which to compare the difference between the environments being observed and

the conditions sought. The danger of this framework as means of analysis, is that focuses

on the products of planning as opposed to quality of synthesis and comprehension. The

ICAF simply assists in constructing a preconceived environment vice trying to unpack

and discern the logic behind the relational qualities of the environment that is more relevant to understanding the observed context.

Perhaps another source, which may serve to enhance and expand the linear frameworks of Mission Analysis, is the 2012 *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* published by the Central Intelligence Agency under the auspice of the United States Government. This guide provides definitions, indicators, and claims to present an analytical framework designed to assist in evaluating an insurgency (Central Intelligence Agency 2012). The work focuses on the commonalities of insurgencies, but heeds warning that analysts should be aware that the specific insurgencies they are examining will probably not exhibit all of the characteristics, or undertake all of the activities, addressed in the guide.

This is a profoundly true and refreshing claim, but I find that beyond definitions, indicators, and characteristics, this guide offers no incorporation of social or political theory to challenge simple categorization and linear output. However, in its own right, as a reference document for clearly defined typologies and common terms, this guide is relevant and useful in the study of insurgency. Notwithstanding, the analytical framework portion found at the end of the guide is nothing more than a loose set of linear, disconnected questions that modestly imply predetermined causal claims as accepted elements of inquiry. Rather, an analytical framework must demonstrate and inquire as to how each aspect of an insurgency is inter and intra related; how and why those relationships change; how conflict can be disaggregated to understand the uninveigled objectives, which will elucidate the dynamic reality of potential direct and divergent outcomes. Case in point, the framework used in the guide suggests that every insurgency

has a clear winner (Central Intelligence Agency 2012), while in fact, "winning" may be an elusive outcome in insurgency.

If it is true that no clear cut theorem exists, which I argue it does not, the complex socially and politically gripping dynamics become ever more relevant toward our enlightenment. Moreover, insurgency dynamics and outcomes are affected by the behavior, perceptions, and opportunities that exist and emerge before and within conflict. As a result, the reward of disaggregating this multilevel complexity, in any insurgency, becomes extremely important, because it has consequences in all aspects of planning and intervention. This gives Unified Action partners considerable leverage as practitioners and enables us to develop deeply informed and broadly enlightened courses of action and policy recommendations.

Standing on the claim that PMESII and other such frameworks exhibit linearity and compel users to think in a linear fashion, this work will now explore the rich and multifaceted theories on the many compelling dynamics of interstate conflict, violence, counterintuitive wartime arrangements, within-conflict agreements, and outcomes. Using the intrastate conflicts throughout the world as context, these theories demonstrate the complexities that Unified Action partners must consider. Furthermore, the following series of subsections will discuss significant gaps in each theory, explain how other theories assist in addressing this gap, and argues which aspects are not considered at all.

<div align="center">Movements are more than Organizations</div>

Within the context of political and military lexicon, insurgency 'movement' and insurgent "organization" are often used interchangeably. It is useful, for the purposes of study and common vernacular, to draw a distinction between the two. An organization

should be thought of as a set of social and political arrangements and participants who have a common set of goals and purposes, and who must interact across multiple action situations at different levels of activity (Gibson et al. 2005). Organizations may be formally or informally constructed, thus defined, the term organization includes, for example, Al Qaeda, Al Nusra Front, the Free Syrian Army, and Boko Haram, religious groups, social networks, clans, tribes, and even families (Betz 2007). Organizations are the product of human effort to order relations by removing uncertainty in repetitive interactions (Polski and Ostrom 1990). A "movement" is not the construction, but rather the driving force, or purpose, in an insurgency. This may come across as a mundane delineation, but it is necessary. As subsequent theories will address in an intuitive sense, movements may end, but the organizational structure may subside, providing a host body for a new movement to grow. Conversely, an organization may fracture and fragment, but the movement remains. In a rather nefarious vein, organizations may fragment and split as a movement morphs or subsides, giving birth to entirely new, more violent, more radical movements. This is an important aspect to clarify as the following theories are examined.

Numerous avant-garde political and social scientists, many of whom are not necessarily concerned with insurgency specifically, argue that pre-conflict frictions, arrangements, and relationships motivate and shape actor behavior before, during, and within conflict's end. The first of these theories concerns the nature of civil war alliance formations, which argues that alliances are pragmatic and formed in order to win the war and maximize postwar political power (Christia 2012; Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2011; Cunnigham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012). This theory of alliance formation posits that the

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smallest possible alliance powerful enough to make victory appear likely will emerge as dependent variable of relative and shared identity within the group (Christia 2012). In this case, shared identity is a counterintuitive factor of unity and group resilience to fractionalization. Groups and subgroups will always align in a way that maximizes expected returns and identities simply become the product of power-driven, coalition building politics (Christia 2012).

Complicating the matter of power and identity further, this theory goes on to illuminate the nature of group and sub-group leadership, which may lead to further fractionalization in the form of group splits and takeovers if a respective leader does not retain enough relative power to keep control amidst a group fractionalization. However, a more nuanced argument holds that shared identity and relative power are simply elements that shape the pre-conflict conditions, and may not necessarily be the only organizing variables and outcome goals (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; Driscoll 2012; McLaughlin and Pearlman 2011). This in turn suggests that other variables are at play within an insurgency, which relative power and shared identity theories do not address as a potentially autonomous subsets of conflict modifiers (Staniland 2012a; Vreeland 2008). Thus, this relative power paradigm applies to the IA framework as a consideration variable, but not the exclusive variable, as to how groups' decisions and behaviors alter the typology of an insurgency, and why various subgroups emerge, subside, and morph.

There is also a set of complementing explanations for insurgent behavior that invokes leadership structure, tactical intensity, and contextual variables in an attempt to discern why political organizations split (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2011; Walter and Kydd 2002; Weinstein 2007), rather than merely why they form. Recent research finds

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that organizations with a factional or competing leadership structure and those that use violence as a tactic are at greater risk to split (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2011). Insurgent groups with strong leadership, tactical control and access to domestic resources are unlikely to fractionalize due to greater relative power and authoritative balancing. In contrast, groups inundated with factionalized leadership (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2011, Hypothesis 1), distinguished by their use of licentious violence (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2011, Hypothesis 2), and confined by limited resources, resulting in external resource dependence and competition (Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2011, Hypothesis 3), are more likely to fractionalize as conflict persists. However, the applied analysis of this theory does not show significant support for the external environment impacting the likelihood that an organization will split. The gaps in this theory further suggest that additional organizational complexities in insurgent organizations might mitigate the relationship between factional or competing elements, such as access to resources, the strength of identity, or how the group exercises violence. Therefore, a more holistic causal explanation for insurgent group structure transubstantiation should include relative power, shared identify, the degree of leadership influence, the acute use of violence, and group access to domestic resources. The IA framework considers these emergent complexities, and addresses this gap in the analysis process.

Considering the political structure theories with regard to insurgent movements also yields rational and significant predictions as to when and why national movements succeed as a dependent variable of organization, composition, and group unity (Staniland 2012c; Wood 2003). Claiming that existing research is missing a way of describing the nature of authority, politics and order in a particular area of conflict at any given time,

this these theories aim to describe the relationship between armed actors and the state with respect to insurgent group power distribution (Staniland 2012a; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009; Parkinson 2013). Recent empirical work finds that alliances seemingly pursued in the spirit of solidarity are not the best option for national movements seeking strategic success, but rather the distribution of power is the key factor in both the actions groups and effectiveness of their movements (Staniland 2012a). This theory further yields predictions as to the typology of an insurgency, which may assist planners in understanding which group, or groups, are the most politically and organizationally significant.

The hypothesis derived from the theory posits that if all the significant groups are in an alliance are under the control of the most significant group, or if only one significant group exists, a hegemonic national movement capable of achieving strategic success is present (Staniland 2012c). If multiple significant groups are in an alliance, but no one group is the most significant, this alliance shares power and is considered united, and this group will act in a way to continually balance power. When natural resources are limited, or when high conflict intensity leads to disagreement, a stronger group may consolidate power and become hegemonic, or the united movement will deteriorate into a fragmented apostasy of competing interests, incapable of ever achieving military or political success (Kydd and Walter 2002; Bose 2007).

This set of theories certainly furnishes our world of understanding with new layers of complexity, but it does not address how insurgencies are intra linked between insurgent groups. Additionally, it raises the inquiry as to whether or not short-term outcomes, even if counterproductive, are mechanisms to actually lay the foundation for

strategic success in the future. These gaps are precisely the type of critical, complex

questions theories such as this bring to our attention, further pushing practitioners to think

deeper. The IA framework builds on the theories and gaps discussed thus far, in addition

to further examining the layers of arrangements and parastatal relationships that often

emerge in an insurgency.

### Looking Deeper at Cooperative Wartime Orders

Another set of theories that informs predictions of political orders and

organizational dynamics in intrastate conflict comes from the resource driven parastatal

literature on state-insurgent cooperation and material resource integration. As a subset of

the macro level alliance and movement typologies theories, there are other theories that

suggest that insurgency bears a family resemblance to competitive state-building

(Staniland 2012b), and conflict arrangements between the incumbent and the insurgent

are continually modified and reorganized through bargains, deals, and accepted norms

(Staniland 2012a). Translated in degrees of cooperation, we would expect that if a

hegemonic insurgent alliance were to actively cooperate with the state, the resulting

political order would include shared sovereignty as the result of a draw.

However, if no such cooperation exists, the incumbent and the insurgent will

continue to clash until one capitulates, or is decisively defeated, resulting in a win or a

loss. This theory goes on to suggest that active and nonexistent cooperation, which can

fundamentally alter the conflict outcome, are byproducts of resource availability and

integration. In a simple scenario, the group that has the ability to innovate, has access to

resources, and can integrate the available resources throughout the group, or subgroups,

has no need to cooperate with the state (Staniland 2012a), and can continue fighting until

the group wins, or is decisively defeated. Alternatively, a group that fails to adjust to wartime circumstances, such as fragmentation within the group, increasing incumbent pressure, or fluctuating resources will interact with the state, or counterinsurgents, in order to survive (Staniland 2012c).

From these scenarios, bargains and deals emerge, further complicating the dynamics of resource considerations, agreements, relative power, identity, and tactical violence discussed thus far in this section. Exploring how these arrangements actually work requires more concepts and more theories. Cooperative wartime orders may sometimes be interim solutions, but we must consider how these wartime arrangements will look at war's end (Rose 2012; Metz 2007). Distribution of control and level of cooperation must be analytically bifurcated, scrutinized, and once again mended to exclusively examine intra group understandings about order and authority, and inter incumbent-insurgent political, social, and economic cooperation (Staniland 2012b).

<div align="center">Reconsidering Insurgency Roles<br>and Parastatal Arrangements</div>

Up to now, the theoretical gaps I have explored suggest that pre-conflict and within-conflict insurgency structures can be explained in part by relative power, power distribution, incumbent-insurgent cooperation, and wartime arrangements. However, an alternate body of theories suggests that conflict shaping at onset and throughout will occur on the basis of the nature of participation (Parkinson 2013), the existence of enduring internal rivalries (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008), and co-optation (Driscoll 2012). Furthermore, another school of thought–a theory of institutional equilibrium– applies suitably into this entire anthology, underscoring the role of state repression and

the effect it has on intramovement unity (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). Nevertheless, additional significant gaps emerge, furthering the search for effective conflict analysis considerations that must be predicated on the need to address individual risk, social complexities, conflict duration, insurgent choices, and dual contestation.

Dynamic social network interactions represent a source of organizational resilience in the face of conflict conditions and must be considered. There are approaches to insurgency conflict that take mobilization, probation and the nature of participation into account, such as theories of individual risk, which presumes that joining an insurgency as a back-end supporter is risky and that doing so lacks reward and status (Parkinson 2013). However, a closer look at the supply lines, as opposed to the front lines, highlights critical locations for political influence opportunities for both the incumbent and the insurgent. Functions such as resupply, logistics and financing are central to sustaining a rebellion, and without these practices, an insurgency is simply reduced to an armed, violent protest (Parkinson 2013; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008).

Deducing this into a quotidian scenario, we would expect to see organizational roles emerge among groups closest to each other on the social interaction and identity spectrum (Parkinson 2013; Pearlman and Cunningham 2011). This theory captures the social reality of the indigenous other, and the risk assumed when joining an insurgent movement. Appreciating this aspect brings an important inquiry forward with regard to the pace of insurgent organization and reorganization, particularly because intra group organizational structure and resilience has been linked to military effectiveness and patterns of violence (Staniland 2012a). Addressing this gap, which this works achieves, provides crucial insight into the study of insurgency, which features organizationally

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sophisticated social circuitry, shedding light on their likely sources of political influence. From this, we can draw links between violent and nonviolent situations in which insurgents and incumbents manage and control violence (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; McLaughlin and Pearlman 2011).

<u>Illuminating the "Solution is Settlement" Fallacy</u>

In the same vein, there is an existing theory that provides a unique analysis of the duration peace after conflict and emphasizes the dyadic perspective of enduring internal rivalries within an insurgency, suggesting that rivalries keep going with a sense of momentum and the terminations of conflict where enduring internal rivalries are present are more likely to be followed by renewed fighting (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Driscoll 2012; DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). In this case, control of the conflict and control of the outcome is simply a matter of control for the duration of peace, as insurgencies rarely, if ever, end in decisive victory. Moreover, this theory posits several factors for the duration of peace, to include the level of democracy of the state, the state capacity to control the conflict and limit violence (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009), the intensity of the conflict, and the duration of the conflict itself (Driscoll 2012; DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). A straightforward run of this theory implies that if an enduring internal rivalry state has the capacity prevent rebel victory, limits the level of violence during conflict, brings the immediate conflict to an end relatively shortly, and has at least a moderate level of democracy, the duration of peace will be long and the potential to arbitrate the rivalry grows exponentially.

This very important argument could well be the basis for understanding the implications of external intervention, whereas it is more likely to be successful if

attempted early, rather than late, as certain intrastate disputes tend to solidify and indurate

to rivalry at onset (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). However, the reality of short-term

solutions breaking down or armed insurgencies maintaining arms at conflict's end are

potentialities we must contend with. An understanding of insurgency that includes failed

negotiations and correlations between the choice to fight or cooperate will contribute to

the analysis if insurgency, and is addressed by this work.

Other scholars who have specifically studied intrastate conflict resolution

appreciate the role of insurgent coalition fragmentation as a mechanism for ending the

conflict, be it a negotiated settlement or decisive victory (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008;

Rose 2010; Krause 2013). The theory that insurgent fragmentation serves a peace

building mechanism suggests that the ability of the incumbent to lure fractionalized

insurgent groups into the state, then use divide-and-rule tactics to pit different factions

against one another, generate parastatal arrangements that disconnect the faction from the

movement and create conditions of dependency on behalf of the state (Driscoll 2012).

These arrangements permeate throughout the conflict, as well as the outcomes. These

cleavages in turn impose institutional constraints on the power-based choice of the

insurgent as to whether or not the group, or sub-group, seeks parastatal cooperation.

Specifically, the insurgent has two choices: fight or install (Driscoll 2012). In a

fight situation, or a war of all versus all, each group expects to gain a certain amount at

the end of the war, and that amount is either perceived to be more valuable, intrinsically

or acquired, than what the state offers (Driscoll 2012). In a scenario where insurgent

groups work together, form an alliance, abjure violence, and back a figurehead ruler on

behalf of the state, they have installed (Driscoll 2012). Of these two choices, install is the

most rewarding in terms of war economy pay off for the insurgent, but the choice to fight

is often more likely based on the solitary perception of the distinct group, and the

incentive to reap all of the postwar power instead of sharing it.

Though this theory illuminates the bottom up view as an emergent equilibrium of

joint insurgent strategy, it does consider intra divergence with regard for the potentiality

for a group to change its collective mind and choose a different strategy within conflict.

For example, an insurgent group that chooses to fight one day may choose to install the

next vis-à-vis emergent resources, opportunities, or the incumbent. In other words,

choices are malleable, and the implications of this reality will alter the conflict and the

outcomes. This work addresses this gap as a consideration for planning.

<p style="text-align:center">Sources of "Insurgency Relevance"<br>Offer More to Consider</p>

Finally, significant research argues that the politics of self-determination are

driven by dual contests–that between the incumbent and the group, and that between

factions within the group (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012; Kydd and Walter

2002; Metz 2007). This theory shows strong support for the importance of fragmentation

and how the phenomenon is driven by violence between rival factions rather than

political institutions (Vreeland 2008; Walter 2006). In an attempt to determine how

internal divisions within insurgent groups seeking self-determination affect the dynamics

of insurgency conflicts, we must consider violence as a choice, and as a response in

comparison with the state and competing factions. Violence is not only an intergroup

dynamic, as between insurgent groups and the state, but also an intragroup dynamic

between groups in the same movement, or even subgroups of the same dominant group.

Of course, this theory is a problematic assumption when the state or the insurgent does not respond with violence, but instead uses nonviolent methods to gain or intensify external support. A key premise of this work is that something is lost when Unified Action partners ignore the absence of certain elements and focus all attention of what is present, and visa versus. I argue that insurgent movement relevance not only comes from the incumbent or from the support base, but also from the international community.

<div align="center">Framing the Gaps</div>

The foundational claim of this argument was demonstrated in the beginning of this chapter. In doing so, it is clear that current military processes and frameworks are proven, useful methods of organizing collective information gathering efforts, as well as focusing the efforts of collective action work, such as planning. This argument in fact builds on the existing doctrinal frameworks and attempts to build on the process with a specific, appropriate, holistic framework for the analysis of insurgency conflict environments. This work has further examined and scrutinized the various complex dimensions of insurgency theories in order to build collective appreciation for the many multilevel dynamics and emergent arrangements, behaviors, and orders that exist in an insurgency environment. In the process of this undertaking, apparent gaps emerged.

First, military frameworks are useful tools for organized data collection and contextual reference, but fall short of providing the level of analysis needed for the complex, dynamic conflict environments. PMESII and ASCOPE are linear elements of mission analysis and therefore direct linear thought. In terms of how this fits into the IA framework, the PMESII-ASCOPE crosswalk matrix is essential to collective, build and communicate contextual, organized information. Juxtaposed to the variety of theories this

work explores, it will be very apparent where the existing frameworks fit nicely, and where they fall short in terms of reaching understanding.

Second, the local cleavages within intra and inter group dynamics, as well as emergent cooperative wartime orders, must be considered in addition to the master cleavages in an insurgency. Insurgencies are not binary conflicts, but complex and ambiguous processes that foster the collective action of local and supralocal actors, whose organizational congealment results in a variety of outcomes (Kalyvas 2006). It is this dynamic, woven into the master cleavage of conflict that creates the most compelling inquires for Unified Action partners.

Third, roles and parastatal arrangements alter the state of conflict and the complexities of these relationships must be considered when attempting to predict future outcomes. Insurgencies are not path dependent affairs. Rather, insurgencies may rise out of opportunity or action (Weinstein 2007). Therefore, in the context of insurgent-incumbent agreements and arrangements, certain actors my act out of opportunistic greed, or out of invested action. This aspect further obscures the clear lines of linear framework deduction, bringing forward ever more reason for a framework that incorporates this element.

Next, interim within-conflict solutions are not settlements (Rose 2010; DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). The wartime arrangements that emerge as a result of wartime implications, may strengthen, disintegrate, or morph at conflict's end. A broached solution may have a specific application or purpose based on the perceptions of those bound to its arrangement. As various elements within the operational environment morph, subside, or increase the interim solution may become null and void in the eyes of

the incumbent, the insurgent, or the population. This phenomenon is evident in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, yet Unified Action partners do not possess a framework to incorporate this into planning and design (Kendall 2008; Mosser 2010; Cleveland and Farris 2013).

Finally, insurgency relevancy has many faces. The legitimacy of the movement may come from within the organization, while relevancy is awarded on behalf of the incumbent or the international community. Conversely, the international community may back a certain movement, while the incumbent denounces its existence. Further convoluting this dynamic, wartime orders with regard to incumbent-insurgent cooperation may result in varying degrees of linkage in a wartime environment (Staniland 2012a). This cooperation may increase the relevance of a certain movement, backed by a cooperatively active organization. However, this, too, is not always concrete and enduring. An active state-insurgent cooperative relationship may exist one day, but subside the next, giving way to potential disorder, violence, or renewed vigor in subgroup aims for consolidation.

In addressing these gaps it is not my intent to pique or criticize the works of the various well respected scholars, or diminish the value of the existing military frameworks. To the contrary, the energy, effort, and rumination invested in this endeavor should demonstrate the very aim of my work: the study of insurgency is not straightforward or linear, nor is it intuitive. However, it is possible and it is necessary. Overall, the diverse and abundant existing literature across political and social science theories motivates and elucidates the Insurgency Analysis framework, and the entirety of

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this work, as reflected in the methodology and research design, which I present in the sections three and four.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This work advances in five parts using a qualitative research methodology with an aim to provide Unified Action partners with a new definition and analytical framework for the study insurgency. The first section scrutinizes existing definitions of insurgency and provides a new, more appropriate definition, based on five deeply grounded claims. The next section neatly depicts and describes the military framework crosswalk I will use as a mechanism for knowledge collection and contextual framing. I then present and describe the typology of explanations of human action in section two, and provide examples as to how each causal logic directs our attention as to how actors behave and make decisions in certain ways. The third section explains each foundationally adaptive intrastate conflict theory in context to the application of insurgency dynamics, along with visual models to clarify each theory. Next, I conceptually disassemble the IA framework as a guide to approach analysis utilizing the various theories as elucidating circuits to the framework motherboard. In the next section I briefly justify the relevance of the selected plausibility probe case in order to refine the foci within the context of the operational environment vis-à-vis the world stage, and to explain why the components of this particular environment emerge as compelling points of inquiry. In the final stage of my analysis, I conduct a plausibility probe of the IA framework and run the process from beginning to end.

My applied research aims at finding a solution as to how Unified Action partners can better understand the multifarious complexities of insurgencies. While military frameworks adopt a linear approach, the primary question driving this study is to

determine the potential benefit of integrating social and political theory into a systems approach for what may prove to be a very useful method for studying complex and adaptive insurgency conflicts. This is of extant concern with respect to the emergent nature of conflict in the world, and practitioners must have the tools to disaggregate the study of insurgency, apply holistic approaches to intervention, and be ready to clearly articulate such complexities to policy level decision makers.

The intent of this cumulative theoretical discussion is to identify relevant gaps in an effort to gain analytical reference that is greater than the sum of what exists. I illustrate my theory building framework through a plausibility probe against the backdrop of the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria. By presenting the framework vis-à-vis contemporary intrastate conflict I disarm the pernicious claim that theory building operates only for its own sake (Waterman and Wood 1992), I provide an applicably relevant work to the existing body of knowledge, and I provide a basis for practical solutions to important Unified Action problems.

I rely on rich diverse social and political theories, as well as data on the warring groups, to apply the Insurgency Analysis (IA) framework to the insurgency in Nigeria. In terms of offering a tangible illustration of the framework's application, I layout the framework first in my analysis, and then illustrate the evidence that led to its development as I unpack each element in a step by step process. I further proceed with both as I apply the framework in a practical sense for Unified Action partners. Thus my work bridges individual-level, group-level, and micro, as well as macro, research through examining and appreciating the applicability of intrastate conflict theories.

Applying the IA framework to insurgency analysis and course of action design prompts Unified Action partners to think carefully about a wide assortment of issues that are important aspects of a particular problem. The more comprehensive, aware and precise our analysis, the better we can understand our solutions. Many of these issues would be overlooked by the technical analyses approach though the exclusive use of military frameworks that consider a relatively narrow range of closely related factors. The IA also provides a means to incorporate diverse participants in insurgency analysis, further widening and deepening the breadth of unified understanding of the operational environment. Because the IA framework demands multiple disciplinary perspectives, it holds the potential to produce a very rich understanding of complex and dynamic social and political situations that emerge in an insurgency. In addition to providing the basis for more effective analysis, this understanding can provide a firm foundation for building consensus for coordinated unified action.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Insurgency requires serious study of all historical experience. Although a wealth
of material existed then [in the 1950s] and much more has since been developed,
no such study has yet been undertaken in this country. . . . In Indochina and Cuba,
Ho Chi Minh and Ernest (Che) Guevara were *more assiduous*.
— Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith,
*On Guerilla Warfare*

In the context of the study of uncertainty and complexity, this statement is quite

authoritative. Though this work does not claim to provide insights into history, it does,

however, present a framework to acquire this undertaking and to be more assiduous as

Unified Action planners. That is to say, the following analysis will demonstrate that a

holistic, design based framework, specifically the Insurgency Analysis framework,

provides a better approach to understanding the known complexities, and unknown

emergent properties amidst insurgency conflict.

This analysis seeks to explain how Unified Action partners can better understand

insurgency the local inter and intra granularity of insurgency. Having situated this work

in the context of the existing theories and frameworks, this section provides a new

definition of insurgency, and presents and probes the Insurgency Analysis (IA)

framework. The theory, vicariously illustrated through the IA framework, suggests that

the dynamic considerations of insurgency conflicts must be disaggregated, studied, and

contextualized with respect to the spiraling emergent properties of insurgency conflicts. If

this is true, which this argument suggests that it is, then we must also conclude that

insurgent and incumbent behavior is chaotic and circumscribed within the local and

master cleavages that stretch the canvas of the operational environment.

The effort in this work will explain the multifarious orders, shifts, decisions, and potential outcomes of insurgency conflicts, as well as provide an applicative framework that reaches beyond theory building and imbeds itself enduringly into the practitioner's quotidian perceptions. The IA framework, which is unpacked and presented in this section, allows Unified Action partners to make specific hypothesis about emergent conditions and overall outcomes in insurgency conflict. The expectation of these hypotheses is that they hold across insurgency conflict environments, irrespective of the contextual components, establishing the framework as a relevant, scalable, portable means of analysis.

## A New Definition of Insurgency

Insurgency has been used for several years in the professional military and interagency parlances. The term has often been used synonymously with other irregular warfare tactics terms, such as terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. In as much, insurgency has been defined in many ways, and even among military practitioners who study the very nature of this conflict, there is no agreement on one definition of the word, or when the term applies. This proves to be quite a hurdle if one aims to analyze and study the topic. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines insurgency as follows: "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict" (Department of Defense 2004).

Bard O'Neill expands this definition, considering social and political aspects of insurgency, with his own definition in *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, noting that insurgencies have been the most common type of warfare since the establishment of formal governments (O'Neill 2005):

Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics. (O'Neill 2005)

However, neither JP 1-02, O'Neill, nor any definition for that matter, provides a

definition of insurgency that incorporates relative power, shared identity, or arrangements

and cooperation. This paper argues that insurgency must be defined in recognition of

multilevel complexity and emergent properties therein. Therefore, this work obtains a

new definition of insurgency constructed on five claims:

Claim 1: Insurgency is an aspect of intrastate conflict, regardless if it is causal or emergent. An insurgency cannot be defined in an isolated sense of autonomous conflict. Therefore, it is an activity within the context of a greater conflict.

Claim 2: An insurgency is not defined exclusively by the movement, or by the organization. The existence, modification, or absence of components in either the order or the purpose drastically changes the nature of an insurgency within the context of the greater conflict, and within itself.

Claim 3: An insurgency definition must incorporate the social and political aspects therein. An insurgency is more than just a movement, as claim 2 obtains, and an activity void of a political aim or some degree of social support is simply a protest. Furthermore, the contentious, more violent aspects of an insurgency may occur between the insurgent factions, not necessarily against the state. As insurgencies become more contentious, so too does the conflict amidst the groups themselves.

The first three claims establish the first portion of a new definition of insurgency:

Insurgency is defined as an emergent contentious activity of intrastate conflict amidst socially and politically organized groups and subgroups.

Claim 4: Insurgency cannot be defined by a specific aim, such as "the overthrow of a constituted government." As history indicates, many insurgencies cooperate with, and even support, incumbent rulers in an attempt to secure relative post war power that is greater than pre-conflict conditions. Likewise, parastatal arrangements emerge within an insurgency conflict environment.

Claim 5: Insurgencies rely on much more than political resource. Furthermore, subversion and armed conflict are simply ingredients within the tactical coterie.

Insurgencies rely on a social base, evolve and subside through political arranging, and at times, but not always, resort to armed conflict.

Claims 4 and 5 completes the new definition of insurgency:

Insurgency is defined as an emergent contentious activity of intrastate conflict amidst socially and politically organized groups and subgroups aimed at gaining and maintaining relative power within an incumbent ruled state through protracted social mobilization, political arranging, and armed conflict.

<u>The Insurgency Analysis (IA) Framework<br>within the Operations Process</u>



Figure 1.   The IA Framework as a Design Tool

*Source*: Adapted by author from Department of the Army, ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.

Modified to accommodate the juxtaposition of the IA framework within the

Operations Process, figure 1 depicts the symbiotic relationship between framing the

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problem and framing the environment with regard to the considerations of each. The IA framework fits nicely within the design methodology for applying the critical and creative thinking process in an insurgency environment.

The operational environment (OE) is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). One model for describing the operational environment is ASCOPE-PMESII. Each letter stands for an aspect of the operational environment: Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events. The six ASCOPE areas of civil considerations are used to inform the six PMESII operational variables: Political—governance, Military—security, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information. ASCOPE-PMESII is population-focused rather than enemy-focused.

| ASCOPE-PMESII | | |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Factors | Relevance |
| Political/Governance: Political actors, agendas, government capability and capacity | Key elements of the formal, informal, and shadow systems of government which significantly influence the local population | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Military/Security: Capabilities in the AO (equipment, mission, resource constraints) | Key elements that could influence the security situation | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Economic: Trade, development, finance, institutional capabilities, geography, regulation | Key elements that influence economic activity in the area | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Social: Demographics, migration trends, urbanization, living standards, literacy/education level, etc. | Key elements that describe or could influence traditional social dynamics in an area | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Infrastructure: Basic facilities, services and installations | Effects on the physical infrastructure: sewage, water, electricity, educational facilities, health facilities, and transportation | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Information: Means of communication, media, telecommunications, word of mouth | Key elements that facilitate the transfer of information to and among the local population | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |

**Contextual Knowledge Framing**

Figure 2.   The ASCOPE-PMESII Data Collection Crosswalk

*Source*: Adapted from Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Handbook 11-16, *Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center Press, 2011), Annex B.

With this crosswalk, Unified Action partners can efficiently collect data from multiple sources and organize their efforts in an organized fashion. I will point out, however, that this process is effective for the first two columns–"descriptions" and "factors," but is idle for determining relevancy. In turn, I keep the "relevance" column associated with this crosswalk as a structural aspect to juxtapose the findings from the application of the next theory set as the critical linkage between "contextual knowledge framing" and preliminary "understanding." The next section of this analysis brings forward the typology of explanations of human action, which establishes the initial elements of critical thinking within the IA framework.

A Typology of Explanations
of Human Action

The first principle concern for understanding the complex dynamics of an

insurgency is to consider the behavior and decisions of the indigenous other with regard

to social interaction and social structures. The four logics (or behavioral claims) I

describe below are named for the element that does their "causal work" (Parsons 2007).

> *Structural Claims* explain what people do as a function of their position vis-à-vis exogenously given 'material' structures like geography, a distribution of wealth, or a distribution of physical power. People's actions vary as their position in a given material landscape varies (Parsons 2007).

> *Institutional Claims* explain what people do as a function of their position within man-made organizations and rules (and within the 'path-dependent' process implied by man-made constraints: people's choices at time *t* alter their own constraints at time *t+1*) (Parsons 2007).

> *Ideational Claims* explain what people do as a function of the cognitive and/or affective elements that organize their thinking, and see these elements as created by certain historical groups of people (Parsons 2007).

> *Psychological Claims* explain what people do as a function of the cognitive, affective, or instinctual elements that organize their thinking, but see these elements as general across humankind, as hard-wired features of 'how humans think' (Parsons 2007).

To better understand these explanations of human action, I offer a simple

anecdote of the indigenous other in a civil war environment amidst an ongoing

insurgency as a primer for application within the context of the IA framework.

Consider a young woman who travels to the market every day to purchase food

for her family because her mother tells her to do so, and her views of familial interaction

dictate that she must obey her parents (organizational rule). Furthermore, she is the only

one in the family who can perform this task (limited resource) since her other siblings are

too young, and her father died in the current conflict. Therefore, she acts within her

environment as a result of geographic location (she must to walk to the market), the organizational rules she is bound to (must obey), and limited resources at hand to accomplish the task–a "structural logic" is at play.

On her way to the store each morning the young woman passes a sign that reads, "The war is wrong, the government is your enemy, join YOUR people in the fight for justice." She reads this sign twice every morning. As a result of this unintentional conditioning and the sensory inputs from her environment, she begins to believe this mantra and feels that it is her obligation to join the fight and avenge her father's death. Her decision to join the insurgency is an action based on an internalized belief as an effect of the environment that surrounds her–this decision could exemplify an ideational logic.

With spells outside of the house everyday on her long trip to the market, she takes advantage of the freedom and listens to the insurgent rhetoric being proselytized in a small café. Taking advantage of this freedom is a rational incentive for a young woman who otherwise has very little privilege in her life. However, the existence of the incentive structure was an unintended tertiary effect of her mother's policy–therefore, institutional logic might obtain.

Thus far, her only involvement in the insurgency has been through passing messages along her daily route, or warning other members of government soldiers approaching the neighborhood. She returns home one morning to find her youngest sister dead as the result of inadvertent gunfire from a lethal exchange between government soldiers and armed insurgents near her home. She blames the government, believing the stories she hears in the café the next morning. Her instinctual response as an effect of her

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intense anger brings her to arms and her position evolves within the insurgency from an auxiliary informant to and armed rebel. Acknowledging the danger of this decision and the greater risk upon her family, not to mention her mother's objection, this psychological claim for her action depicts an irrational decision based on the cognitive response to her previous experience.

From this anecdote, we see that not all actions and decisions are based on our interpretation of the environment in relation to how we determine the causal story should unfold. Seemingly innocuous elements, such as where someone lives or family structure, can establish pathways within an environment that may have nefarious ends. Linking the operational variables we collect and organize through environment framing to the behavioral claims based actions I just discussed, brings us considerably closer to better understanding the relevancy of the litany of factors within any given operational environment.

**ASCOPE-PMESII**

| Description | | Factors | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Political/Governance: Political actors, agendas, government capability and capacity | A S C O P E | Key elements of the formal, informal, and shadow systems of government which significantly influence the local population | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Military/Security: Capabilities in the AO (equipment, mission, resource constraints) | A S C O P E | Key elements that could influence the security situation | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Economic: Trade, development, finance, institutional capabilities, geography, regulation | A S C O P E | Key elements that influence economic activity in the area | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Social: Demographics, migration trends, urbanization, living standards, literacy/education level, etc. | A S C O P E | Key elements that describe or could influence traditional social dynamics in an area | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Infrastructure: Basic facilities, services and installations | A S C O P E | Effects on the physical infrastructure: sewage, water, electricity, educational facilities, health facilities, and transportation | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Information: Means of communication, media, telecommunications, word of mouth | A S C O P E | Key elements that facilitate the transfer of information to and among the local population | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |

**Contextual Knowledge Collection** ———— **Interpreting Relevance**

**Linkage**

STRUCTURAL (S)
*"THE OBSTACLE COURSE"*
•CLIMATE
•AGRO-ECONOMY
•MACRO-ECONOMICS

INSTITUTIONAL (I)
*"RULES IN USE"*
•PATTERNS OF ACTION
•LAWS
•SOCIAL STATUS

IDEATIONAL (i)
*"NORMS"*
•IDEAS
•CULTURE
•PERCEPTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL (P)
*"HARD WIRING"*
•BEHAVIOR
•BIASES
•INSTINCTS

Figure 3.  Contextual Relevance Linkage Model

*Source*: Adapted from Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Handbook 11-16, *Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center Press, 2011), Annex B.

Associated Intrastate Conflict Theories: Establishing
the Foundation of the IA Framework

The IA framework is a unifying apparatus for analyzing an insurgency conflict environment that includes physical and socio-political science formulations of insurgency dynamics. The framework fulfills the need for a behavioral, social and political analysis of insurgency conflict. In order to construct this framework, this thesis first established a new definition of insurgency in the context to contemporary intrastate conflict,

addressing the armed, political, social, and economic elements of an insurgency, which have been excluded collectively in other definitions. Next, it adopts the view that an insurgency is a complex system that consists of complex inputs, emergent outputs, multilevel throughputs and dynamic processes. It incorporates the neutral, interdisciplinary vocabulary derived from a foundation of intrastate conflict theories to describe the structure and processes of insurgency in a multitier conceptual map.

<div align="center">
Dynamics of Formation, Organization, and
Emergent Properties at Early Onset
</div>

Formation and organization set the circumstances within which insurgency activities exist and become palpable in a social and political context. Three rich and novel perspectives in describing and understanding this complex phenomenon are: (1) Minimum Winning Coalition (Christia 2012); (2) Wartime Political Orders (Staniland 2012a); and (3) Power Distribution (Krause 2013). This analysis does not compare or contrast these four theories. Aspects of each theoretical claim were identified in chapter 2 and the associated gaps were exposed. Instead, the framework-building portion of this analysis discusses each claim and builds a series of qualitative Insurgency Analysis Considerations (IAC) from the stated hypotheses to link the critical aspects of each theory in relation to understanding insurgency organizations as vacillating systems. In this way, the analysis put forward in this work will permeate the gaps and create a solid foundation for collective analytical inquiry into insurgencies in the form of the IA framework.

## Minimum Winning Coalition

This theory posits that "alliances are instrumental in order to: (1) win the war; (2) maximize the group's share of postwar political control" (Christia 2012). Therefore, insurgent groups must attain, and maintain, enough power to secure victory, but remain small enough to avoid having to share postwar payoffs. In essence, this is a "survival" based argument for insurgent behavior in establishing social order within. Though shared identity is an aspect of onset formation, it is relative power that directly links action to perceived outcomes in an insurgency. From the stated hypotheses of this theory, five Insurgency Analysis Considerations (IAC) are derived:

> IAC 1. Commitment: a weaker alliance partner, even when it appears to be in the winning faction, will often prefer to defect to a balancing alliance and prolong the conflict if this gives that group a chance to secure more relative post-conflict power (Christia 2012).

> IAC2. Identity: warring groups will form shared identity narratives to correspond to their power-determined alliance choices (Christia 2012).

> IAC 3. Balancing: if outright military victory appears to be the likely outcome, groups will bandwagon with whichever group appears most powerful (Christia 2012).

> IAC 4. Splits: group leaders who lose perceived relative power, but who still retain enough power to control the group, will suffer a group split. The splinter faction may join up with an opposing group, or it may strike out on its own (Christia 2012).

> IAC 5. Fractionalization: as a given group's perceived relative power decreases, it will have an increased risk for fractionalization, either as a result of disagreements about strategy or an asymmetric distribution of perceived relative power loss among the subgroups, which threatens the group's survival and which leads to divergent opinions among subgroups as to which side is likely to win (Christia 2012).

> IAC 6. Duration: disparate group insurgency conflicts will last longer than binary conflicts, while increased fractionalization will have more alliance changes (Christia 2012).

Appendix A depicts a model of the Minimum Winning Coalition with respect to power

and shared identity, group fractionalization, and perceived outcomes to walk each

hypothesis as an IAC through the "theoretical map."

Wartime Political Orders

With an understanding of how insurgencies organize, fragment, and segment to

attain and maintain relative power, it is essential to describe the relationship between

insurgents and the incumbent and how this phenomenon is prevalent throughout conflict

as a mechanism of political power (Staniland 2012c). Considering that cooperation and

conflict may never end, these political orders are the "rules" that structure interaction and

shapes political orders. It is best to describe these political orders utilizing the following

figure in concept formation to make analytical sense of the array of relationships:



Figure 4.   Wartime Political Order Matrix

*Source*: Cooperative assignment collection adapted from Paul Staniland, "States,
Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders," *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 2 (June): 243-
264.

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The first dimension of insurgency political order is the distribution of territorial control, which "reflects the presence and structure of armed actors in a particular territorial domain, which is important for shaping the types of relationships and arrangements that are possible" (Staniland 2012a). This dimension brings forward the first two Insurgency Analysis Considerations from this theory:

> IAC 7. Segmented distribution of control: the incumbent and the insurgency group(s) control some territory that is distinct and separate (Staniland 2012a).

> IAC 8. Fragmented distribution of control: the incumbent and the insurgency group(s) control territory throughout an area of contestation (Staniland 2012a).

Territorial control within the geographic state is important to understand one element of power, but this theory broadens this analysis in terms of how territorial control influences the nature of incumbent-insurgent relationships, characterized by three levels of cooperation. The levels of cooperation in an insurgency conflict environment establish the next three Insurgency Analysis Considerations from the Wartime Political Orders theory:

> IAC 9. Active Cooperation: involves clear coordinated action towards a shared objective, whether jointly ruling territory, attacking shared enemies, or colluding over elicit economics (Staniland 2012a).

> IAC 10. Passive Cooperation: involves live-and-let-live bargains structured around norms of acceptable actions and the creation of 'red lines' by the incumbent and the insurgent below which each side is willing to restrain from certain actions (Staniland 2012a).

> IAC 11. Nonexistent Cooperation: involves intense conflict and hostility, in which norms and expectations of violence are unpredictable and fluid (Staniland 2012a).

From these levels of cooperation, political orders emerge, which differ according to the distribution of control. The emergent political orders complete the Insurgency Analysis Considerations developed from this theory:

IAC 12. Shared sovereignty/Collusion: a negotiated form of political order in which the insurgent organization(s) retains autonomy and standing structures of coercive capability (Staniland 2012a). This can be seen as "turning a blind eye."

IAC 13. Spheres of Influence/Tacit coexistence: incumbent and insurgent leaders engage in low-level but recurrent communication over which types of actions and policy are acceptable and which will trigger an escalated response (Staniland 2012a). This may be referred to as "conscious collaboration."

IAC 14. Clashing Monopolies/Guerilla Disorder: pit all efforts of the incumbent and the insurgent against one another across clearly defined battle lines (Staniland 2012a). This is the order that most definitions of insurgency center around . . . "all-out war."

<u>Power Distribution</u>

The next theory to consider as a foundational aspect of the IA framework is the counterintuitive argument "that alliances seemingly pursued in the spirit of solidarity are not the best option for national movements seeking strategic success, but rather distribution of power is the key factor in both the actions of groups and the effectiveness of their movements" (Staniland 2012b).

Based on the number of significant insurgent groups and their alliances, three types of movement systems emerge, as depicted in figure 6:

# OF SIGNIFICANT GROUPS

|  | ONE | TWO OR MORE |
|---|---|---|
| YES | HEGEMONIC | UNITED |
| NO |  | FRAGMENTED |

ALL SIGNIFICANT GROUPS IN ALLIANCE?

Figure 5.   Power Distribution Theory: A Typology of National Movements

*Source*: Peter Krause, *The Structure of Success: How the Internal Distribution of Power Drives Armed Group Behavior and National Movement Effectiveness* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2014), 77.

Using the Typology of National Movements matrix, the aspects of group composition and distribution can be analyzed in terms of type of movement, which yields significant deductions as to the likelihood of the movements overall success. These deductions are portrayed in the next set of three Insurgency Analysis Considerations:

IAC 15. Hegemonic Movement: one significant group exists, and the remaining subgroups are in the alliance under the one significant group (Staniland 2012a).

IAC 16. United Movement: all significant insurgent groups are in an alliance and two or more significant groups exist (Staniland 2012a).

IAC 17. Fragmented Movement: all significant groups are not in an alliance, and two or more significant groups exist (Staniland 2012a).

As this theory demonstrates, not all united organizations are as cohesive as they appear. Furthermore, it is compelling to deduce the significance of each typology in terms of intrastate conflict potential outcomes. These deductions are condensed in the remaining three Insurgency Analysis Considerations of this theory:

IAC 18. Lose: fragmented insurgent organizations will likely fail in mobilizing a strong social support base, frivolously waste political and economic resources on

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infighting, therefore allowing the incumbent to defeat, neutralize, or consume the organizations piecemeal, or in whole. In turn, the insurgent organization will not retain significant interlude influence and political capital to remain incipiently active (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).

IAC 19. Draw: united insurgent organizations that fail to consolidate power under one group and become hegemonic, or resist fragmentation, will also not achieve strategic success, but they will have the ability to prolong the conflict and bring the incumbent to negotiated terms (i.e. a draw). With this in mind, a united insurgent organization will also retain postwar social and political influence since they were not "defeated" by the incumbent. Leaders within a united movement may likely attain positions in post-conflict state affairs (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).

IAC 20. Win: hegemonic movements lack counterproductive mechanisms, maintain complementary group incentives, and obtain increased coherence and credibility. A hegemonic movement is likely to achieve strategic success through overwhelming political defeat of the incumbent, supported by decisive armed action. Hegemonic movements may potentially end intrastate conflict swiftly and violently, or swiftly and peacefully (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).

The first three theories demonstrate the multilevel complexities and emergent properties that exist as insurgent organizations form and organize and how movements are politically aimed. As discussed, insurgencies are not static activities that begin in a clearly defined way, with clearly defined goals, fought between clearly defined "sides." In fact, insurgencies may experience more infighting than incumbent clashing. In the same vein, the social, political and organizational orientation can substantially shape the conflict from onset, making dramatic divergence in the outcome very difficult, or unlikely, with respect to international intervention.

In the first three steps of this analysis, a new world of possibilities has been exposed in terms of insurgency dynamics. Thus far, this work has established the following:

1. a new definition of insurgency;

2. an operational environment context relevancy frame linking PMESII-ASCOPE to behavioral aspects of structural, institutional, ideational, and psychological causal stories; and

3. laid the ground work for the insurgency onset deductions with regard to formation, organization, control, cooperation, and enduring conflict factors presented in twenty Insurgency Analysis Considerations. Figure 7 provides a visual model of the analysis thus far.



**New Definition of Insurgency:**
Insurgency is defined as an emergent contentious activity of intrastate conflict amidst socially and politically organized groups and subgroups aimed at maintaining relative power within an incumbent ruled state through protracted social mobilization, political arranging and armed conflict.

**PROBLEM FRAME**

**BUILD CONTEXTUAL RELEVANCE**

PMESII / ASCOPE

STRUCTURAL (S)
"THE OBSTACLE COURSE"
•CLIMATE
•AGRO-ECONOMY
•MACRO-ECONOMICS

INSTITUTIONAL (I)
"RULES IN USE"
•PATTERNS OF ACTION
•LAWS
•SOCIAL STATUS

IDEATIONAL (I)
"NORMS"
•IDEAS
•CULTURE
•PERCEPTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL (P)
"HARD WIRING"
•BEHAVIOR
•BIASES
•INSTINCTS

ANALYZE THE DYNAMICS OF FORMATION, ORGANIZATION AND EMERGENT PROPERTIES AT EARLY ONSET

•COMMITMENT
•IDENTITY
•BALANCING
•SPLITS
•FRACTIONALIZATION
•DURATION

•TERRITORIAL CONTROL
•COOPERATION
•EMERGENT POLITICAL ORDERS

•MOVEMENT TYPOLOGY
•EARLY ONSET EMERGENT OUTCOMES

Figure 6.   Foundation of the IA Framework

*Source*: Created by author.

It is important to note, that this work will not characterize insurgency as a series of "phases." Therefore, the analysis will not develop in phases. These initial steps are

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simply building the conceptual foundation of the IA framework, so that the source of introspection is clearly understood. As depicted in figure 7, building contextual relevance and the analysis of the early onset emergent dynamics is not conducted in a linear, "step" like fashion. It is continuous. As new information and emergent situations become apparent, the context and the initial dynamics may change. This entire process of analysis is continuous, expanding, and becomes increasingly difficult before it the rewards are prevalent.

<div align="center">

Sustaining Insurgency: Nature of Participation
and Parastatal Arrangements
</div>

The first set of theories provided a granular abstract of how an insurgency may potentially grow within an existing intrastate conflict, or be the cause of the conflict as a whole. Understanding the nature of how an insurgency formed, organized, the territory they do and do not control, and the level of cooperation gives Unified Action partners an appreciation for 'what is going on' as they approach the planning process. This is essential.

The next set of theories explores how an insurgency is sustained (Staniland 2012c; Walter 2006; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2003; Parkinson 2013), and what decisions insurgent groups, and subgroups, have to make at critical times in relation to time, resources, and strength. However, just as the entire process of insurgency analysis is not linear, these theories are not disjointed from the previous set in a phase like manner. Rather, these theories are intimately associated with the previous deductions and, at times, can be juxtaposed back and forth at any time in the analysis process. This work encourages that method.

## Nature of Participation

As Robert Taber has eloquently elucidated, an insurgency consists of much more than the media portrayed "fighter." The "back-end military practices" (Staniland 2012c; Parkinson 2013) or resupply, logistics and finance are central to sustaining a rebellion; critical in its infancy, necessary in its duration. A compelling deduction from a closer look at the supply lines instead of just the front lines is that the dynamic social network interactions in the operational environment represent the enduring source of insurgent organization resilience in the face of fragmentation, state manipulation, and agreeing to interim negotiated settlements (Krause 2013; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2003; Parkinson 2013). In layman's terms, the social base keeps insurgencies alive. Whereas the quotidian ties that exist in all civil societies "serve as a bridging function" (Parkinson 2013) for insurgent support and insurgent action, it is important that this analysis consider this. From this, two Insurgency Analysis Considerations come to the fore:

> IAC 21. Social Networks: within an insurgency conflict environment, social networks are critical locations of insurgency resilience and political development (Parkinson 2013).

> IAC 22. Social Position: an individual's position in social networks affects not only their likelihood of participation, but also the organizational roles they assume (Parkinson 2013).

Recall the anecdote offered in the causal claim discussion of this analysis. The dynamics of social interaction in a quotidian sense are not autonomous to influence within an insurgency. As this analysis continues to build upon the foundation of the IA framework, these multilayered complexities will emerge as dominant considerations of the operational environment.

<center>Insurgency Alliance Game Theory:</center>
<center>Parastatal Relationships</center>

The next theory of this formative section of analysis explores a formal model of

intrastate conflict dynamics with a game theory model between the incumbent and the

insurgent. Whether an insurgency grows amidst the fertile ground of intrastate conflict, or

the insurgency is the root cause of the contestation, the incumbent will stand idly by as

the opposition grows. One "tactic" of incumbent rulers is to lure insurgent organizations

into the state. These wartime arrangements become parastatal entities that may endure

throughout the conflict, or subside as conditions in the conflict environment change and

the relationship is no longer needed to maintain equilibrium.

As incumbents use "divide-and-rule" tactics to achieve relative advantage in

intrastate conflicts, "negotiated settlements often become face-saving arrangements"

(Driscoll 2012) when parity is absent, or when victory is elusive. In addition to the

instrumentality of this theory toward anticipating incumbent and insurgent choices, it

further posits three propositions for a conflict may end. These relational equilibriums and

associated potential outcomes are cleanly described below in relation to insurgent

behavior as opposed to incumbent offerings:

> State Failure Equilibrium (SFE): If all the groups choose to fight to eliminate the other and the state, this will result in state failure equilibrium (Driscoll 2012). The outcome of an SFE is likely to be decisive victory, or a negotiated settlement championed by the strongest group (Driscoll 2012).

> Full Incorporation Equilibrium (FIE): if all insurgent groups choose to install, full incorporation equilibrium will be reached (Driscoll 2012). In a FIE postwar environment, the movement will have political seats in the state, maintain geographically autonomous regions, and share in postwar power (Driscoll 2012).

> Partial Incorporation Equilibrium (PIE): if only some of the groups choose to install, only partial incorporation equilibrium will be attained (Driscoll 2012). In a PIE post conflict state, certain groups will have limited political seats, and

<center>54</center>

movement groups will become bitterly divided, or strongly unified. The potential for a more violent, longer conflict is high (Driscoll 2012).

Considering these three choices, it is imperative for analytical clarity within the IA framework to discuss the further potentiality that lies within an FIE and PIE environment. As we logically consider the retort of either stasis, secondary options become apparent. Having achieved PIE, interim negotiations may lead to the increased potential for FIE if war economy payoff is high, parastatal opportunities are lucrative, and the cost of fighting is perceived as too costly of behalf of the insurgent group (Pearlman and Cunningham 2011; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). However, the potential for FIE decreases if superficial offers are made for parastatal incorporation on behalf of the incumbent, and the domestic resources are limited, or stalwartly controlled by the state (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). Thus, for PIE to become FIE, domestic resources must be abundant, and the incumbent must be agreeable to insurgent group incorporation.

If the indications of these emergent decisions are present within the operational environment, certain deductions then become possible with regard to insurgent choices. The following four Insurgency Analysis Considerations are provided:

ICA 23. Conflict Modifiers: as foreign aid and investment increase, more insurgent groups may opt for incorporation into the incumbent organization (Parkinson 2013).

ICA 24. Aggregate Cost: as the aggregate cost of war increases, more insurgent groups may opt for incorporation into incumbent organization, seeking to ease the burden and re-establish balance (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).

On the alliance formation side of the ledger, this game theory develops the connective tissue of minimum winning coalition structure, adding flexibility to the utility of these theories as holistic approaches to disaggregating the study of insurgency in its

infancy and as it grows. Furthermore, "scrutiny of group fragmentation aids understanding of conflict processes by explaining when new groups are likely to merge or when they are relevant in the conflict process" (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). Armed with this depth of understanding to probe with granular detail, Unified Action partners are better equipped to recognize, appreciate, and holistically consider the complex nature of insurgency.

<p style="text-align:center;">The Complexity of Conflict's Ends</p>

The final theory that must be considered as a guidepost in the IA framework considers the nature enduring rivalries within a state. Put otherwise, conflicts that experience peace spells do not necessarily experience an end to conflict (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008; Rose 2010; Walter and Kydd 2002). These disputes can endure because of territorial claims, which invoke elements of wartime political order in relation to power distribution, or because of status and relevancy within the interim peace environment. If these disputes remain after a solution has been reached, the 'end' is artificial, and conflict will endure with degrees of intensity dependent upon the political activity and armament of the insurgent groups (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). One aspect that Unified Action partners seek to understand in analysis is how conflict may end, and how collective action will affect the menu of potential outcomes. The final six Insurgency Analysis Considerations provide the analytical inquire to address this:

> ICA 25. Level of Democracy: the greater the level of democracy within a state during conflict, and at the time of negotiation, the peace will likely last longer as society is more likely to feel incorporated and included. Whereas in a less democratic state, as in an authoritarian regime, new grievances will, trump the peace and insurgent organizations can once again mobilize the social base (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).

ICA 26. State Capacity: the greater the capacity of the state to maintain relative advantage and counter the insurgency with nonviolent means, the duration of peace will be longer, new conflict will be less likely (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).

ICA 27. Tactical Intensity of War: harsh, violent responses on behalf of the incumbent and the insurgent make lasting settlement harder as political narratives will likely include the atrocities of the other side. This goes hand in hand with the state and the insurgent's ability to address the conflict with nonviolent means. If achieved in this manner, peace is likely to last longer (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).

ICA 28. Military Victory: decisive military victory yields longer peace; whereas negotiated settlements are unstable and prone to collapse (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).

ICA 29. Conflict Duration: longer conflicts yield longer peace, as society, the incumbent, and the insurgent structures grow weary of war, so it takes longer to rearm, re-equip, and remobilize. However, duration of conflict rarely has an impact on the conflict ending permanently. The duration of peace may be long or short, but the conflict will return (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008).

ICA 30. Timing: interventions in insurgency conflict environments are more likely to be successful if attempted early rather than late, as certain frictions tend to coalesce early on in the conflict, or as conflict renews.

The previous six Insurgency Analysis Considerations are expressed as such from the hypotheses of the enduring rivalry theory. Though each consideration offers Unified Action partners a contrasting approach to understand outcome complexities, it is compelling that enduring settlements, as in a genuine end to conflict, is rarely, if ever, achieved. With this in mind, Unified Action partners must understand that each approach to intervention may not obtain a clear outcome. Furthermore, collective intervention approaches may still fall short of permanent settlement, and timing, not only form, is a key element to consider.

To this point, this work has established the following:

1. a new definition of insurgency;

2. an operational environment context relevancy frame linking PMESII-ASCOPE to behavioral aspects of structural, institutional, ideational, and psychological causal stories;

3. laid the ground work for the insurgency onset deductions with regard to formation, organization, control, cooperation, and enduring conflict factors presented in the first 20 Insurgency Analysis Considerations;

4. incorporated social networks and participation as critical sustainment considerations;

5. described parastatal relationships as mechanisms for balance; and

6. provided new perspectives as to the verity in conflict outcomes. Bridging each theory into analytical inquires has produced 30 Insurgency Analysis Considerations (IAC) that can now be used in the IA Framework to scrutinize, probe, and challenge every aspect of the Operational Environment.

Figure 8 provides a complete foundation blueprint of the IA framework.

[Note: A consolidated list of the Insurgency Analysis Considerations (IAC 1-30) can be found is Appendix D for use during IA framework analysis.]

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Insurgency is defined as an emergent contentious activity of intrastate conflict amidst socially and politically organized groups and subgroups aimed at maintaining relative power within an incumbent ruled state through protracted social mobilization, political arranging and armed conflict.

**PROBLEM FRAME**

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•INSTINCTS

COMPLEXITIES

AGGREGATE COST

PARTICIPATION

MODIFIERS

ARRANGEMENTS

LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY

CONFLICT DURATION

TIMING

TACTICAL INTENSITY

STATE CAPACITY

MILITARY VICTORY

OUTCOMES

ANALYZE THE DYNAMICS OF FORMATION, ORGANIZATION AND EMERGENT PROPERTIES AT EARLY ONSET

•COMMITMENT
•IDENTITY
•BALANCING
•SPLITS
•FRACTIONALIZATION
•DURATION

•TERRITORIAL CONTROL
•COOPERATION
•EMERGENT POLITICAL ORDERS

•MOVEMENT TYPOLOGY
•EARLY ONSET EMERGENT OUTCOMES

Figure 7.   IA Framework Foundation Blueprint

*Source*: Created by author.

## The Analytical Approach of the IA Framework

The IA framework is best viewed as a systematic method for organizing insurgency analysis activities that is built on a wide variety of more specialized intrastate conflict theories used in the political and social sciences. It does not replace existing military frameworks, but provides a means to synthesize collective work. The IA framework helps practitioners comprehend complex social and political situations in an insurgency and break them down into manageable sets of practical activities. When applied rigorously to insurgency analysis and intervention design, Unified Action partners have a better chance of avoiding the oversights and simplifications that lead to failure, or exacerbation of contentious dynamics.

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## Purpose of the IA Framework

The purpose of the IA framework is to expand a commonly held understanding of insurgency for all Unified Action partners that informs policy, collective action, and planning. It also assists in establishing a strategic baseline of realistic approaches against which Unified Action engagement can be evaluated. The IA framework is distinct from any existing framework, and is uniquely designed for insurgency analysis.

## When to use the IA Framework

An IA framework analysis should be the first step in any Unified Action partner planning process in an insurgency conflict environment to inform policy, design collective action activities, implement or revise programs and approaches, and assist in decision making. Whenever the IA framework is used, all of the Insurgency Analysis Considerations (IAC 1-30) should be addressed and explored; however, the depth and breadth of the information may be constrained to time and access to information.

## How to Conduct an IA Framework Analysis

The IA framework is designed to be used by all Unified Action partners at the Operational, Strategic, and National Policy planning levels. IA framework analysis may be iterative with initial results and built upon as engagement expands, opportunities emerge, and information becomes more accessible and accurate. The level of detail into which the IA framework examines is unlimited.

## Exercise One: Establish Contextual Relevance

The first task in conducting IA framework analysis is to establish contextual relevance. There are five steps involved in Exercise One.

Step 1: Collect and organize preexisting and existing contextual information.

Reference ICA 1, 2, 7, 8, 16, 17, 25 and 26.

Questions might include, but are not limited to:

What historical, societal, political, or economic conditions and narratives contribute to and shape the conflict?

What can be determined about insurgent commitment?

Are there indications of territorial control?

Are the groups united, fragmented or is the insurgency hegemonic?

Utilizing the associated IACs to address linear "what" questions, already links dynamic and emergent aspects within the environment that can be applied throughout the process. [*Note:* The ASCOPE-PMESII crosswalk simply one way this step can be accomplished. Unified Action partners who use other collective frameworks or methods are encouraged to use whichever method serves their organizational needs best. The key in this step is to organize the information in a coherent manner, making collective information sharing more efficient.]

## ASCOPE-PMESII

| Description | | Factors | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Political/Governance: Political actors, agendas, government capability and capacity | A S C O P E | Key elements of the formal, informal, and shadow systems of government which significantly influence the local population | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Military/Security: Capabilities in the AO (equipment, mission, resource constraints) | A S C O P E | Key elements that could influence the security situation | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Economic: Trade, development, finance, institutional capabilities, geography, regulation | A S C O P E | Key elements that influence economic activity in the area | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Social: Demographics, migration trends, urbanization, living standards, literacy/education level, etc. | A S C O P E | Key elements that describe or could influence traditional social dynamics in an area | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Infrastructure: Basic facilities, services and installations | A S C O P E | Effects on the physical infrastructure: sewage, water, electricity, educational facilities, health facilities, and transportation | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |
| Information: Means of communication, media, telecommunications, word of mouth | A S C O P E | Key elements that facilitate the transfer of information to and among the local population | Why is a factor relevant to the local population? How does it affect stability? |

**Contextual Knowledge Framing**

Figure 8.   Contextual Knowledge Framing Matrix

*Source*: Created by author.

Step 2: Examine Structural claims within the operational environment, such as geography, GDP, distributions of physical power and associated human actions (i.e. where people live, where they work and go to school, etc.).

Step 3: Examine Institutional claims, such as laws, man-made organizations, rules, individual's function of their position, and constraints.

Step 4: Examine Ideational Claims to include cognitive and affective elements, such as historical groups and affiliations.

Step 5: Examine context to understand Psychological claims within the environment, society, civil societies, and indications as to how humans think in this environment.

By working through steps 1 through 5 within Exercise One and applying the associated IACs, Unified Action teams should begin to understand and be able to communicate the grievances, sources of resistance and resilience, and describe them within the context of the situation. In Exercise One, the vast amounts of information that

Unified Action partners must pursue can be cleanly organized, communicated and linked to dynamic considerations and causal stories. Already, planning teams can be begin to describe identity groups and their perceptions of security, articulate how linear snapshots of data can be linked with aspects of control and power, and explain how structures and institutions may aggravate or assuage tensions in the operational environment.



Figure 9.   Contextual–Behavioral Interpretation Crosswalk

*Source*: Created by author.

Exercise Two: Articulate Multilayer Complexities
and Emergent Conditions

The second task in conducting IA framework analysis is to understand, articulate,

and identify the complexities of perceived risk, participation, adaptation, and

arrangements.

Step 1: Recognize splits, fractionalization and balancing through group narratives, key actor (leadership) behaviors, and indicators of infighting.

Reference IAC 3, 4 and 5.

Have any new groups emerged recently? Can these groups be tracked back to having affiliation with a stronger group within the conflict? Is the group entirely new?

Are there conflicting insurgent group narratives present?

Have any groups grown significantly as conflict grows more violent or subsides? Do these groups share a common identity, or are they unified as an aspect of relative power?

Step 2: Examine, understand and classify degrees of incumbent-insurgent cooperation in the conflict environment.

Reference IAC 9, 10 and11.

What are the indicators of clear coordinated action? Does the incumbent and the insurgent share territory in contested areas?

Do insurgent or incumbent actions seemingly go "unchecked" until certain "lines" are crossed? If so, are respondent actions violent? If so, to what degree?

Is the conflict intense and hostile with no signs of cooperation with unpredictable, fluid acts of violence?

Step 3: Consider social networks, levels of social participation and perceived risk within the social base.

Reference IAC 21, 22 23 and 24.

Are social networks interlinked, open, repressed, or disparate? Are there identifiable indicators of social interaction and support to the insurgency?

Has foreign investment increased? What are the sources of foreign investment? Has the incumbent had recent success in reintegrating insurgent groups and subgroups into the governed society?

Have any insurgent groups lost popular support in the environment? Are there any indicators of increased recruitment or overt displays of power (i.e. public gatherings, collective grouping in government controlled areas)?

During Exercise Two, Unified Action planners will find it helpful to draft a narrative statement describing the Operational Environment in context and in relation to causal stories, levels of cooperation, organization and structure, and make predictions with the assistance of the Insurgency Analysis Considerations. Multiple narratives from the incumbent and the insurgent perspectives will be additionally useful to create deeper context and granular understanding.

<p align="center">Exercise Three: Complexities of Increasing or<br>Decreasing Conflict Resolution</p>

The third task of IA framework analysis is to examine, understand, and articulate the potential outcomes and political orders that may emerge at this point in conflict.

Step 1: Based on the understanding and context built in step 1, determine the type of political order that may emerge, and identify indicators in the operational environment to substantiate this claim.

Reference ICA 12, 13, and 14.

Has the incumbent attempted to seize or occupy insurgent controlled territories, or does it turn a blind eye to the insurgent organizations maintaining autonomy of controlled areas?

Are incumbent and insurgent leaders engaging in low level, recurrent communication to determine actions and policies that are acceptable to both?

Are the actors engaged in all out conflict along clear battle lines within the state?

Step 2: Determine the likelihood of certain outcomes (win, lose, draw) and examine the within-conflict dynamics to determine the extent of certain outcomes.

Reference ICA 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 29 and 30.

Does a hegemonic movement exist? If so, has the hegemonic movement made advances toward consolidating gains and defeating the incumbent politically or militarily?

Has the incumbent made moves to defeat, neutralize or consume fragmented subgroups or made attempts to sever various groups from their support base?

Have the incumbent reached out to insurgent groups, or have insurgent leaders reach out the incumbent to negotiate terms or offer post conflict agreements?

Has the intensity of the conflict, the duration of the conflict, or certain interventions exacerbated frictions, or mitigated violence?

Unified Action partners should specify near-term events to predict negative or positive changes in the Operational Environment. In the IA framework, these events are referred to as emergent arrangements, and are shaped by the perceptions, conditions, actions, and accords in the insurgency conflict environment.

When the Insurgency Analysis framework is used to support Unified Action planning, policy formulation, or crisis action planning, the findings and narratives frame the problem in the Operations Process and feed the analysis for planning. The IA framework is not a planning process, but rather a planning tool. Completing IA framework analysis should be the first step in understanding how to approach insurgency conflicts from the Operational, Strategic, and National Policy levels. It is also imperative to remember that the collective action approach during IA framework analysis is the most productive. Optimal use of this framework provides for review and constant re-evaluation of the situation. As demonstrated in the theoretical framing and step-by-step conceptual application of the IA framework, even a single application provides Unified Action partners a more robust and holistic understanding of the dynamics driving, shaping and influencing insurgency conflict.

[Note for application: At this point, it is helpful to refer to Appendices B, C, and D and have them readily visible for use as reference tools as the IA framework is applied in the next section]

<div align="center">

Plausibility Probe Case Selection:
Nigeria's Relevance
</div>

As late as March of 2014, anyone asking an average American to point to Nigeria on a map most likely would get a few finger points around the Horn of Africa or "somewhere in the middle." Though also cutting edge and relevant as a case study, Nigeria was selected as the plausibility probe case of this work because it meets the complex, multilevel application criteria this work seeks to analyze and it is not necessarily clear what constitutes the opposition, what their interim goals are, and what they may do next as there has been no single unifying explanation that can be recognized and appointed. Insurgencies within highly contentious intrastate environments are complex, interconnected, dynamic, and difficult to understand. For the application portion of this work, I thus opted for a plausibility probe conflict that would allow for the deconstruction of the multilevel complexities at hand through application of the Insurgency Analysis (IA) framework using pertinent data and emergent dynamics. This is the quintessential environment to test the IA framework.

Nigeria, with multiple cross cutting cleavages along religious (sectarian) dimensions has long been a region of instability and weak incumbent control in a contentiously polarized region of the world. However, Nigeria's past state of contained instability is no guarantee that it will not grow more unstable and more violent, as is the potentiality of any contentiously fecund state. Within the master cleavages of the ongoing

insurgency, asymmetric local cleavages have emerged that make the study of this specific

conflict all the more relevant and compelling. Ergo, the IA framework further

demonstrates timely and relevant utility for Unified Action partners.

The inferences are further probed through a unique progression of insurgency

group formation and organization theories for the prominent factions most known for

conflict altering politics and influences in Nigeria. Similar to the interstate conflict

belligerent analysis often utilized in conventional war environments, the aspects captured

in the IA framework further illuminate the intra rivalries and splits within the insurgency

and how the inter group relationships have changed over the course of the conflict. I

further find that the intra and inter group dynamics correspond well to the dynamics of

group decisions, emergent arrangements, and establish pathways to potential outcomes

and emergent dangers. Going further, the study of this insurgency accentuates the

convergence of the formation and organization theories on the level of parastatal

relationships and wartime agreements through the use of a range of "within-conflict"

decisions juxtaposed to predicted outcomes for Unified Action partners to consider.

IA Framework Plausibility Probe: Nigeria

The current situation in Nigeria, where the militant Islamist separatist group Boko

Haram (although technically referred to by its leader as Jama'atu Ahlu-Sunnah

Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad-Group of the Followers of the Prophet for Propagation and Holy

Struggle) (IHS Jane 2014) kidnapped a purported 300 school girls in and around Chibok,

Borno on April 15, 2014 invokes the very theories this work has elucidated thus far–

incumbent capability, international intervention, social and political tactics, and the like.

More alarming, however, than the lack of answers in the Chibok kidnappings is the lack

of understanding on the part of Unified Action partners as to what the insurgency aims to accomplish, why they act as they do, and what, if anything, the international community can do about it. Recent proposals have included sending US Special Operations Forces into Nigeria to rescue the kidnapped children, and advisors from the United States, United Kingdom, China, France and Israel have been dispatched to assist in the effort.[8] This developing reaction, though meaningful as an emotionally satisfying response, will only serve to address the immediate crisis and is not foreign policy. Rather, it further highlights the inaction of the Nigerian government. Unified Action partners, from policy makers to advisors on the ground in this case, must obtain a deeper understanding of the problem frame. Boko Haram and the festering insurgency in Nigeria did not 'arrive on the scene' yesterday. It has origins, substance, deeply rooted alliances and arrangements, dimensions of control and power; it is compelling and precarious and Unified Action partners must have the tools to understand how and why this is.

Using only substantiated open source information and general situational understanding, the following application of the IA framework with regard to current collective action approaches and policy options will demonstrate the effectiveness, relevance, and broad utility of this robust approach. Having the following appendices available to reference and follow is encouraged:

Appendix B: The Insurgency Analysis Framework

Appendix C: Insurgency Analysis Exercises

Appendix D: Insurgency Analysis Considerations List

Appendix F: Country Study of the Insurgency in Nigeria (Contextual Information)

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[8]As of 9 May 2014.

Exercise One: Establish Contextual Relevance

Step 1: Collect and organize preexisting and existing contextual information.

Refer to Appendix F for contextual information. The country study was obtained from IHS Jane's online index of insurgency, conflict, and security to establish a baseline of data that Unified Action planners will typically have available or be able to access as a means of environmental framing. Furthermore, the ASCOPE-PMESII method was not used in its exact form in this exercise based on the availability of authenticated data. Unified Action planners are encouraged to use the method that suits their needs most efficiently. Based on the information available, the information was organized in a way to provide contextual insight using PMESII as well as causal narrative considerations from steps 2 through 5.

Nigeria–a Causal Narrative

Nigeria's problems go beyond divisive politics, territorial claims and identify. There is ethnic and religious conflict, deeply rooted poverty, and corruption. All of these narratives are deeply interconnected. Boko Haram, once an obscure, radical Islamic cult in the North, is evolving into an insurrection with support among the impoverished and alienated Northern population. In the Niger Delta, militant leaders are signaling that they will attack oil production facilities if the Nigerian government (the incumbent) does not address their long-standing grievances, especially the oil industry's destruction of the environment and the pervasive sentiment that the region has not benefitted from the wealth it produces. And in Plateau state in the Middle Belt, ethnic cleansing and religious violence continue, fueled by quarrels over land and water, with little international attention.

Further weaving the structural and ideational blanket of tension in the country, income distribution in Nigeria is among the worst in the world, with most of the wealth going to a select few. Little of the oil money trickles down or is invested in the infrastructure and job-creation necessary to accommodate the youth bulge and to stabilize the country. Nigerians routinely say that their day-to-day existence has deteriorated, that civilian government is not the same thing as democracy, and that the country is not becoming more prosperous. What there was of a middle class in the 1960s and the 1970s —seen at the time as an engine for sustainable development—has largely disappeared.

In the countryside, agriculture and fishing employ a majority of Nigerians, but attract very little investment or future family sustainability. Particularly in the Borno state, where Boko Haram rules largely unopposed, families increasingly send their children to the cities because agriculture cannot support the expanding rural population. This rapid urbanization is continuing without the necessary investment in infrastructure and many from the rural areas are moving to cities to find work . . . living from hand to mouth. But the cities are not generating jobs. Manufacturing is declining; the result of a collapsed power sector, over-valued currency, and the cheap imports, especially textiles, that flood the domestic market, sometimes with the connivance of corrupt customs officers.

Nigeria's growing poverty and underdevelopment are nation-wide, but much worse in the northern half of the country, contributing to the increasing isolation of the predominately Muslim population. This greatly contributes to the growing space in parts of the northern society available for radical Islamic groups such as Boko Haram to take hold. Often shaped by their religious teachers in a period of Islamic religious revival, the

crowds of unemployed and impoverished children, youths, and university graduates are increasingly ripe for recruitment by the likes of Boko Haram.

It will take great political skill for the government, under President Goodluck Jonathan, to address the alienation in the North. Boko Haram has already rejected outright attempts to negotiate by the Borno state government, and suicide attacks, assassinations and mass kidnappings may be a sign of new linkages to transnational terrorist groups that did not previously exist, though the character of Boko Haram remains indigenously Nigerian.

Using available information, organized and collected within existing military frameworks, then applying causal logics to develop a contextual narrative, gives Unified Action partners a better appreciation and understanding for how collective planning information elucidates the operational environment. Already, it is apparent that corruption, geographic location, religion, income, control of resources and perceptions–founded or unfounded–shape the nature of insurgencies. What may appear as something "new" or "growing" to the outside observer, the contentious elements of conflict are ever present, taking shape and morphing. Understanding this does not necessitate the need for advisors, foreign intervention, and exacerbation of a capricious situation.

Exercise Two: Articulate Multilayer Complexities
and Emergent Conditions

Step 1: Recognize splits, fractionalization and balancing through group narratives, key actor (leadership) behaviors, and indicators of infighting.

Step 2: Examine, understand and classify degrees of incumbent-insurgent cooperation in the conflict environment.

Step 3: Consider social networks, levels of social participation and perceived risk within the social base.

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<u>Collective Action–A Predictive Claim</u>

Considering the current situation in Nigeria concerning Boko Haram, the Nigerian Government response, and international intervention, this next step will provide an interpretation of how the situation will unfold in the next few days, weeks, years and decades.

Boko Haram's direct linkage to Al Qaeda, specifically Al Qaeda in Mali (AQIM), cannot be confirmed. However, regardless of the linkage, Boko Haram is currently the dominant militarized, insurgent organization in Nigeria and, therefore, maintains a relative power base. It is known that the group has fractionalized at least once into a subgroup–Ansaru–as a result of divergent opinions on strategy, tactics, and the use of violence. Further splits within this fractionalization will likely occur as relatively powerful subordinate leaders lose perceived power. It is highly likely that Ansaru will grow, absorbing splinter factions over the next few months as increasing pressure is placed upon Boko Haram through direct targeting from the Nigerian government. This fractionalization will increase the duration of this insurgency conflict, and the international community must be prepared for a conflict that will last for a very long time. A "quick solution" such as rescuing the kidnapped girls from Chibok or "advising" Nigerian forces will have no impact toward ending in the insurgency any sooner, or with any further degree of an expected outcome. Intervention and engagement in this conflict will be long, arduous, and complex.

Furthermore, Unified Action partners must consider the threat that increased recognition, such as adding Boko Haram to the Department of State Terrorist Watch List on 14 May 2014, and increased international attention may lead to acceptance, relevance

and political value in the eyes of AQIM, thus bringing Boko Haram and Ansaru under a hegemonic movement in Nigeria. With rules, policies, and direction under AQIM, it is likely that Boko Haram will become the militant faction of the organization, while Ansaru takes on a more political, international support seeking role. This is a dangerous emergent complexity, and it must be considered. Under a hegemonic order, counterproductive mechanisms, such as infighting and further fragmentation, are mitigated, while coherence and credibility is heightened. The likelihood of the current local insurgency growing into a strong, regional, hegemonic movement is possible and it is already apparent that efforts to make this happen exits, such as the name change from Boko Haram–Western Education is Sin–to Jama'atu Ahlu-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad–Group of the Followers of the Prophet for Propagation and Holy Struggle–to posit a more jihadist image. Unified Action partners must consider options that do not push AQIM into making political moves to counter increasing foreign intervention.

Unified Action partners must also look at the level of cooperation between the state and insurgent organizations in Nigeria. For nearly a decade, the Nigerian government and insurgent like movements have held a passive level of cooperation, where "live-and-let-live" bargains have governed interaction. The territory in northern Nigeria, in Borno, has long been considered an "off limits" area to government troops, as long as militant organizations do not threaten oil resources, or conduct attacks outside of Borno. This has allowed organizations, such as Boko Haram, to grow inside of Borno, and create an unofficial autonomous Muslim caliphate. However, over the past year (2013-2014) the level of incumbent-insurgent cooperation has evolved into nonexistent cooperation, where "red-lines" have been crossed, such as Boko Haram attacks in Abuja

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and government moves into Borno to secure oil reserves, and hostility has dramatically increased. As tensions increase, violence will grow more unpredictable and fluid.

As foreign assistance increases, so too will support for the insurgency from outside actors from Chad, Camaroon, and Niger, much like the "International Brigades" of the Spanish Civil War. The local Nigerian conflict will soon evolve into a regional conflict, and assistance will soon be needed in the aforementioned countries, in order to thwart the violence within their borders. Unified Action partners must be ready for this, and have plans to intervene ahead of the problem.

### Exercise Three: Complexities of Increasing or Decreasing Conflict Resolution

Step 1: Based on the understanding and context built in step 1, determine the type of political order that may emerge, and identify indicators in the operational environment to substantiate this claim.

Step 2: Determine the likelihood of certain outcomes (win, lose, draw) and examine the within-conflict dynamics to determine the extent of certain outcomes.

The likely result of the emergent complexities in Nigeria at present day will be that of clashing monopolies and disorder. The incumbent, under Goodluck Jonathan's leadership, is ready and willing to pit all efforts, including international support, against the growing insurgency. Furthermore, the insurgent factions are willing to do the same. The passing weeks bear witness to the increasing widespread violence. As long as the state and Boko Haram maintain the capacity to counter each other with violent responses, this will likely occur until the intensity reaches a point where both the incumbent and Boko Haram lose support and pursue nonviolent means to reestablish balance.

This brings up the question of "timing." The international community will stand for a "no-response" option. So, the question becomes when and how. The truth of the

matter is, intervention should have occurred long ago, early on, when frictions were still malleable and hard lines were yet to be drawn. However, that collective-action ship has sailed. The issue now becomes getting ahead of the next problem, which from this analysis, will be regional assistance, preventing insurgency consolidation under AQIM, and reigning in the tit-for-tat violence.

<div align="center">Deductions</div>

The purpose of a probe is not just to inform what is going on inside, but also provide the contextual understanding to then know how to proceed. The good news in Nigeria is that a potential answer already exists. Ansaru broke way from Boko Haram over disagreements in the use of violence. It is known that this faction seeks nonviolent means of political power and representation for the disenfranchised. It is also known that AQIM does not seek to become the "bill payer" for Boko Haram's actions in Nigeria, and have not demonstrated a desire to become involved.

In order to maintain balance, bring forward a champion of nonviolent options, and to avoid provoking AQIM involvement, the best option is to bring Abu Usamatu Al-Ansari to the table and begin working whole-of Nigerian government approach. Unlike Boko Haram, Ansaru is not adamant on territorial claims or the abolishment of all non-Sharia entities. Within an environment of negotiation and cooperation, this is a possible solution to delegitimizing Boko Haram, keeping AQIM at bay, and ceasing the widespread violence in Nigeria. The dynamics and complexities in motion cannot be reverted, ignored, or "reset." The only solution is to move forward with options that have feasible outcomes. However, like most insurgencies within contentious intrastate

conflicts, this will not be easy; the answers are not singular, and the results are not immediate.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Unified Action partners' role in U.S. policy development, military operations, or foreign intervention is to possess skills to fully analyze, comprehend, and convey the multifarious dynamics of the operational environment. As the U.S. continues to confront an ever changing world containing unconventional adversarial threats utilizing asymmetric tactics, it is imperative for decision makers to appreciate the minutiae within the complexity of the operational environment. As power and authority declines within nation states throughout the world and resource cursed regions approach new tensions, insurgency will become the most predominant form of warfare within the next decade. Due to the inherent political nature of insurgency, it is necessary to look beyond the lethal aspects and frame problems beyond the first phases of intervention, and understand that objectives and outcomes may change.

This study develops a new broad, inclusive definition of insurgency and a unique, holistic framework for insurgency analysis. It further adopts a neutral interdisciplinary vocabulary, and develops a comprehensive description based on cutting edge political science theory, covering decades of research and study. Insurgencies are described as emergent contentious activities of intrastate conflict amidst socially and politically organized groups and subgroups aimed at maintaining relative power within an incumbent ruled state through protracted social mobilization, political arranging and armed conflict, which morph, yield varied outcomes, and are affected by human behavior. The resulting framework, based on the new definition of insurgency and terminology, deeply considers and describes the structures and processes of insurgency

that have never been examined in a collective way. The framework provides a language and structure to support a more productive dialogue among all Unified Action partners.

The Insurgency Analysis (IA) framework yields a more inclusive framework to describe all insurgencies than the existing military and interagency frameworks and stand alone theories discussed in chapter 2. The framework is holistic in that it includes all the physical and social science formulations of insurgencies and both contemporary and historical insurgencies and describes all insurgencies rather than a specific one. The framework fulfills the need for formulating a scientific approach that provides a general accepted definition and description of insurgency.

Prior to this work, a generally accepted framework for insurgency analysis did not exist. Currently, analysts are using several different scientific disciplines and approaches, such as historical analysis, political science, warfare, anthropology, mathematics, sociology, that attempt to describe the functions of an insurgency. The different frameworks lead to multiple, conflicting definitions and descriptions of insurgency that have made it difficult for Unified Action partners to develop effective U.S. foreign policy and collective action approaches.

<u>Areas of Further Study and<br>Recommendations</u>

This work has attempted to theorize upon the multifarious dynamics and emergent complexities of insurgency. In the process of addressing some long-standing questions on insurgency conflicts, it has also opened the door for new directions of study and research that would further broaden and refine this framework. Related, although this work only examines insurgencies in the context of intrastate conflict, it would be interesting to

consider the relevance of this approach, considering causal stories and narratives, emergent complexities, and multilevel dynamics, in interstate or regional conflicts. Unified Action partners stand to benefit from this holistic approach, which could open many avenues of broad range collective understanding for the entire spectrum of modern conflict.

Beyond broadening the scope of application, future research can also deepen this study's empirical approach observation and experimental study in such ongoing conflicts as in Syria, Mali, Colombia, the Philippines to name a few. The hope of this work is that Unified Action partners who are already interested, knowledgeable, and involved in the study of insurgency will take it upon themselves to explore the definition and framework in new applications to the cases they are most familiar. In this regard, a new collective action project at the national level will allow for effective comparisons and broader collective understanding to inform and implement foreign policy.

Finally, there is more work to be done on the connection between the theory of this study and the existing design methodology approaches. For the purposes of this work, the IA framework has been adapted to problem framing within the operations process, to better understand the operational environment in insurgency conflicts. Therefore, further research should explore how this new definition and framework fits within the construct of collective action courses of action experimentation. The more of this work and research that gets undertaken, and the more collaborative and cumulative that research is, the more Unified Action partners will contribute to the policy debates that invoke Unified Action.

Implications: Narrow Spectrum Response

This study began with the observation that Unified Action partners lack a clear definition of insurgency, as well as a framework for insurgency analysis. From this observation, this study further elucidated the lack of US policy to properly respond to emergent insurgency threats that threaten US interests worldwide. Typical U.S. responses through engagements to pursue U.S. interests are broad spectrum and developed to address a large range of issues. It is important to consider the impact of using broad spectrum responses on the "native" enemies of those the US supports. If more native enemies survive, morph, and develop, they will add to the ever increasing multifarious nature of intrastate conflict. Some U.S. engagements actually add to this phenomenon, rather than achieving any long term policy goals.

Narrow spectrum response is much more selective and focuses on a specific engagement approach, in a specific way, against a specific problem. Utilizing the IA framework for analysis of insurgency, allows for narrow spectrum response options, and provides Unified Action partners the tools to communicate the purpose and objectives of such responses. As Americans are learning to a great a growing cost, insurgency is more than a topic of historical research. Considering that the United States is still deeply engaged and fighting in Afghanistan, intensely partnered in the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Colombia, Somalia, Mali, and many more allied nations throughout the world, broad spectrum responses of "do something and adapt" are no longer politically or fiscally feasible. However, neither is doing nothing. With various regions of Africa and Europe ever fecund environments for volatile insurgency, the U.S. must understand the nuances, with passionate granularity, of the operational environment and the problem at

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hand, in order to develop narrow spectrum responses that achieve policy goals. This

study and the Insurgency Analysis framework provide tools to accomplish this.

# GLOSSARY

Conflict: *n*. A state of open, often prolonged fighting; a battle or war. *v*. To be in or come into opposition; differ.

Framework: A set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitutes a way of viewing reality.

IA Framework—Insurgency Analysis framework (Author definition): A theory based system of assumptions, concepts, dynamics and complexities that constitutes a way of viewing and analyzing insurgency.

Incumbent (Author interpretation): The "government," the "state," the actor, or actors, in office who holds and maintains power.

Insurgency (new definition by Author): Insurgency is defined as an emergent contentious activity of intrastate conflict amidst socially and politically organized groups and subgroups aimed at gaining and maintaining relative power within an incumbent ruled state through protracted social mobilization, political arranging and armed conflict.

Insurgent (new definition by Author): A non-state actor within an insurgency organization not recognized as a belligerent.

Organization: An organization can be thought of as a set of institutional arrangements and participants who have a common set of goals and purposes, and who must interact across multiple action situations at different levels of activity. Like institutions, organizations may be formally or informally constructed. Organizations are the product of human effort to order relations by removing uncertainty in repetitive interactions (Gibson, et al. 2005).

Parastatal Relationship (Author interpretation): An incumbent-insurgent arrangement that is controlled wholly or partly by the incumbent, to include paramilitary, political, economic, and social entities.

Unified Action partners (ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*): Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with which Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Unified action partners include joint forces and components, multinational forces, and U.S. government agencies and departments.

APPENDIX A

VISUAL MODEL OF THE MINIMUM WINNING COALITION (MWC) THEORY



*Source:* Matt Strohmeyer, USAF, "Minimum Winning Coalition Model" (Class assignment, Local Dynamics of War Scholars Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2014).

THE INSURGENCY ANALYSIS (IA) FRAMEWORK



*Source*: Created by author.

APPENDIX C

INSURGENCY ANALYSIS EXERCISES


Exercise One: Establish Contextual Relevance


The first task in conducting IA framework analysis is to establish contextual relevance. There are five steps involved in Exercise One.

Step 1: Collect and organize preexisting and existing contextual information.

Reference ICA 1, 2, 7, 8, 16, 17, 25 and 26

What historical, societal, political, or economic conditions and narratives contribute to and shape the conflict?

What can be determined about insurgent commitment?

Are there indications of territorial control?

Are the groups united, fragmented or is the insurgency hegemonic?

Step 2: Examine Structural claims within the operational environment, such as geography, GDP, distributions of physical power and associated human actions (i.e. where people live, where they work and go to school, etc.)

Step 3: Examine Institutional claims, such as laws, man-made organizations, rules, individual's function of their position, and constraints.

Step 4: Examine Ideational Claims to include cognitive and affective elements, such as historical groups and affiliations.

Step 5: Examine context to understand Psychological claims within the environment, society, civil societies, and indications as to how humans think in this environment.


Exercise Two: Articulate Multilayer Complexities
and Emergent Conditions

The second task in conducting IA framework analysis is to understand, articulate, and identify the complexities of perceived risk, participation, adaptation, and arrangements.

Step 1: Recognize splits, fractionalization and balancing through group narratives, key actor (leadership) behaviors, and indicators of infighting.

Reference IAC 3, 4 and 5

Have any new groups emerged recently? Can these groups be tracked back to having affiliation with a stronger group within the conflict? Is the group entirely new?

Are there conflicting insurgent group narratives present?

Have any groups grown significantly as conflict grows more violent or subsides? Do these groups share a common identity, or are they unified as an aspect of relative power?

Step 2: Examine, understand and classify degrees of incumbent-insurgent cooperation in the conflict environment.

Reference IAC 9, 10 and 11

What are the indicators of clear coordinated action? Does the incumbent and the insurgent share territory in contested areas?

Do insurgent or incumbent actions seemingly go 'unchecked' until certain 'lines' are crossed? If so, are respondent actions violent? If violence is present, is it widespread and indiscriminate, or contained and specific?

Is the conflict intense and hostile with no signs of cooperation with unpredictable, fluid acts of violence?

Step 3: Consider social networks, levels of social participation and perceived risk within the social base.

Reference IAC 21, 22 23 and 24

Are social networks interlinked, open, repressed, or disparate? Are there identifiable indicators of social interaction and support to the insurgency?

Has foreign investment increased? What are the sources of foreign investment? Has the incumbent had recent success in reintegrating insurgent groups and subgroups into the governed society?

Have any insurgent groups lost popular support in the environment? Are there any indicators of increased recruitment or overt displays of power (i.e. public gatherings, collective grouping in government controlled areas)?

<u>Exercise Three: Complexities of Increasing</u>
<u>or Decreasing Conflict Resolution</u>

The third task of IA framework analysis is to examine, understand, and articulate the potential outcomes and political orders that may emerge at this point in conflict.

<u>Step 1</u>: Based on the understanding and context built in step 1, determine the type of political order that may emerge, and identify indicators in the operational environment to substantiate this claim.

Reference ICA 12, 13 and 14.

Has the incumbent attempted to seize or occupy insurgent controlled territories, or does it turn a blind eye to the insurgent organizations maintaining autonomy of controlled areas?

Are incumbent and insurgent leaders engaging in low level, recurrent communication to determine actions and policies that are acceptable to both?

Are the actors engaged in all out conflict along clear battle lines within the state?

<u>Step 2</u>: Determine the likelihood of certain outcomes (win, lose, or draw) and examine the within-conflict dynamics to determine the extent of certain outcomes.

Reference ICA 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 29, 30.

Does a hegemonic movement exist? If so, has the hegemonic movement made advances toward consolidating gains and defeating the incumbent politically or militarily?

Has the incumbent made moves to defeat, neutralize or consume fragmented subgroups or made attempts to sever various groups from their support base?

Have the incumbent reached out to insurgent groups, or have insurgent leaders reach out the incumbent to negotiate terms or offer post conflict agreements?

Has the intensity of the conflict, the duration of the conflict, or certain interventions exacerbated frictions, or mitigated violence?

APPENDIX D

CONSOLIDATED INSURGENCY ANALYSIS

CONSIDERATIONS (IAC) LIST

IAC 1. Commitment: a weaker alliance partner, even when it appears to be in the winning faction, will often prefer to defect to a balancing alliance and prolong the conflict if this gives that group a chance to secure more relative post-conflict power.

IAC2. Identity: warring groups will form shared identity narratives to correspond to their power-determined alliance choices.

IAC 3. Balancing: if outright military victory appears to be the likely outcome, groups will bandwagon with whichever group appears most powerful.

IAC 4. Splits: group leaders who lose perceived relative power, but who still retain enough power to control the group, will suffer a group split. The splinter faction may join up with an opposing group, or it may strike out on its own.

IAC 5. Fractionalization: as a given group's perceived relative power decreases, it will have an increased risk for fractionalization, either as a result of disagreements about strategy or an asymmetric distribution of perceived relative power loss among the subgroups, which threatens the group's survival and which leads to divergent opinions among subgroups as to which side is likely to win.

IAC 6. Duration: disparate group insurgency conflicts will last longer than binary conflicts, while increased fractionalization will have more alliance changes.

IAC 7. Segmented distribution of control: the incumbent and the insurgency group(s) control some territory that is distinct and separate.

IAC 8. Fragmented distribution of control: the incumbent and the insurgency group(s) control territory throughout an area of contestation.

IAC 9. Active Cooperation: involves clear coordinated action towards a shared objective, whether jointly ruling territory, attacking shared enemies, or colluding over elicit economics.

IAC 10. Passive Cooperation: involves live-and-let-live bargains structured around norms of acceptable actions and the creation of 'red lines' by the incumbent and the insurgent below which each side is willing to restrain from certain actions.

IAC 11. Nonexistent Cooperation: involves intense conflict and hostility, in which norms and expectations of violence are unpredictable and fluid.

IAC 12. Shared sovereignty/Collusion: a negotiated form of political order in which the insurgent organization(s) retains autonomy and standing structures of coercive capability. This can be seen as "turning a blind eye."

IAC 13. Spheres of Influence/Tacit coexistence: incumbent and insurgent leaders engage in low-level but recurrent communication over which types of actions and policy are acceptable and which will trigger an escalated response. This may be referred to as "conscious collaboration."

IAC 14. Clashing Monopolies/Guerilla Disorder: pit all efforts of the incumbent and the insurgent against one another across clearly defined battle lines. This is the order that most definitions of insurgency center around . . . "all-out war."

IAC 15. Hegemonic Movement: one significant group exists, and the remaining subgroups are in the alliance under the one significant group.

IAC 16. United Movement: all significant insurgent groups are in an alliance and two or more significant groups exist.

IAC 17. Fragmented Movement: all significant groups are not in an alliance, and two or more significant groups exist.

IAC 18. Lose: fragmented insurgent organizations will likely fail in mobilizing a strong social support base, frivolously waste political and economic resources on infighting, therefore allowing the incumbent to defeat, neutralize, or consume the organizations piecemeal, or in whole. In turn, the insurgent organization will not retain significant interlude influence and political capital to remain incipiently active.

IAC 19. Draw: united insurgent organizations that fail to consolidate power under one group and become hegemonic, or resist fragmentation, will also not achieve strategic success, but they will have the ability to prolong the conflict and bring the incumbent to negotiated terms (i.e. a draw). With this in mind, a united insurgent organization will also retain postwar social and political influence since they were not "defeated" by the incumbent. Leaders within a united movement may likely attain positions in post-conflict state affairs.

IAC 20. Win: hegemonic movements lack counterproductive mechanisms, maintain complementary group incentives, and obtain increased coherence and credibility. A hegemonic movement is likely to achieve strategic success through overwhelming political defeat of the incumbent, supported by decisive armed action. Hegemonic movements may potentially end intrastate conflict swiftly and violently, or swiftly and peacefully.

IAC 21. Social Networks: within an insurgency conflict environment, social networks are critical locations insurgency resilience and political development.

IAC 22. Social Position: an individual's position in social networks affects not only their likelihood of participation, but also the organizational roles they assume.

ICA 23. Conflict Modifiers: as foreign aid and investment increase, more insurgent groups may opt for incorporation into the incumbent organization.

ICA 24. Aggregate Cost: as the aggregate cost of war increases, more insurgent groups may opt for incorporation into incumbent organization, seeking to ease the burden and re-establish balance.

ICA 25. Level of Democracy: the greater the level of democracy within a state during conflict, and at the time of negotiation, the peace will likely last longer as society is more likely to feel incorporated and included. Whereas in a less democratic state, as in an authoritarian regime, new grievances will trump the peace and insurgent organizations can once again mobilize the social base.

ICA 26. State Capacity: the greater the capacity of the state to maintain relative advantage and counter the insurgency with nonviolent means, the duration of peace will be longer, new conflict will be less likely.

ICA 27. Tactical Intensity of War: harsh, violent responses on behalf of the incumbent and the insurgent make lasting settlement harder as political narratives will likely include the atrocities of the other side. This goes hand in hand with the state and the insurgent's ability to address the conflict with nonviolent means. If achieved in this manner, peace is likely to last longer.

ICA 28. Military Victory: decisive military victory yields longer peace; whereas negotiated settlements are unstable and prone to collapse.

ICA 29. Conflict Duration: longer conflicts yield longer peace, as society, the incumbent, and the insurgent structures grow weary of war, so it takes longer to rearm, re-equip, and remobilize. However, duration of conflict rarely has an impact on the conflict ending permanently.

ICA 30. Timing: interventions in insurgency conflict environments are more likely to be successful if attempted early rather than late, as certain frictions tend to coalesce early-on in the conflict, or as conflict renews.

# APPENDIX E

## CONSOLIDATED LIST OF CAUSAL LOGICS

<u>Structural Claims</u> explain what people do as a function of their position vis-à-vis exogenously given "material" structures like geography, a distribution of wealth, or a distribution of physical power. People's actions vary as their position in a given material landscape varies.

<u>Institutional Claims</u> explain what people do as a function of their position within man-made organizations and rules (and within the "path-dependent" process implied by man-made constraints: people's choices at time $t$ alter their own constraints at time $t+1$).

<u>Ideational Claims</u> explain what people do as a function of the cognitive and-or affective elements that organize their thinking, and see these elements as created by certain historical groups of people.

<u>Psychological Claims</u> explain what people do as a function of the cognitive, affective, or instinctual elements that organize their thinking, but see these elements as general across humankind, as hard-wired features of "how humans think."

APPENDIX F

COUNTRY STUDY OF THE INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

<u>Political</u>

Political Representation

Boko Haram adheres to a fundamentalist form of Islam under which participation in any political system except one based on Sharia is strictly forbidden. As such, Boko Haram does not participate in the Nigerian political system, officially.

Relevancy and Recognition

On 4 June 2013, President Jonathan approved the proscription of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization.

Stated Aims and Objectives

The primary aim of Boko Haram is to establish an Islamic state based on Sharia throughout Nigeria, with the secondary aim being the wider imposition of Islamic rule beyond Nigeria. While there is no evidence of any official connection to Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram's aims and ideology are comparable, particularly in its emphasis on the individual obligation to wage jihad, and the adoption of takfiri (excommunication) ideology - the belief that Muslims who do not adhere to the strict Salafist version of Islam are apostates who are no better than kafirs (infidels), and may therefore legitimately be targeted.

Boko Haram's overriding ideology is a rejection of the influence of western ideas and culture on the lives of the people in their area of operation. The local populace giving the group the name Boko Haram, which means, "Western civilization is sinful" in the local Hausa dialect, evidences this stance. However, statements by Umaru in August 2009 - in which he threatened to attack southern, Christian tribes-suggest that while the

group espouses a jihadist agenda, it is not entirely dissimilar to the ethnically and religiously motivated identity groups which have long engaged in sub-state militancy in Nigeria.

## Campaign Overview

Boko Haram first emerged in northern Nigeria in 2003 under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, a young cleric from Nigeria's Yobe State. The first armed operation by the group which became Boko Haram occurred in late December 2003, when approximately 200 militants briefly seized the town of Kanama in Yobe State, on the border with Niger, and raided police stations and barracks as well as several government installations in an attempt to gather weapons for the group. While the nascent militant Islamist uprising was quickly crushed by security forces by early January 2004, several police officers were killed and a number of police stations and government buildings were set on fire and destroyed during the violence.

Following the failed uprising in Yobe, Boko Haram militants attacked several police stations in the Gwoza and Bama areas of the neighboring state of Borno in September 2004, killing four police officers, although almost 30 militants were killed and the group was again dispersed.

Although these initial abortive uprisings by Boko Haram were both short-lived and small-scale, they aroused considerable consternation in both the Nigerian capital Abuja, and abroad, particularly in the US, which feared that the largely ungoverned region of the Sahel, along the border with northern Nigeria, could develop into a new front in its ongoing global war on terror. Such fears accounted for the prompt and ruthless response to the uprisings by Nigerian security forces—a response which appeared at the

time to have rendered Boko Haram defunct. However, reports suggest that in the years following 2004, the scattered individual survivors from these initial uprisings slowly began coalescing once more, while remaining underground for fear of further reprisals from the security forces.

The most obvious manifestation of this re-emergence of militant Islamism was the April 2007 assault on a police station in the city of Kano in Kano State. During the assault, the police station and a number of police vehicles were gutted by fire, while 12 police officers were killed and two wounded. The following day, a police assault on the militants' enclave resulted in the death of 25 militants.

The events in Kano, as well as the arrest of 10 suspected militants in November 2007 during which explosives were recovered, suggested that militant Islamism remained an ongoing threat in Nigeria. Nigerian authorities also stood by their claims that Boko Haram was connected to international jihadists, alleging that Al-Qaeda was funding the training of Nigerian militants in Mauritanian camps.

The ongoing threat posed by Boko Haram was subsequently confirmed when the group launched a major attack on two police stations in the city of Bauchi in the northern state of Bauchi on 26 July 2009. A soldier and 38 militants were killed when the attack on the stations led to a prolonged armed clash in the Dutsen Tenshin area of the city. Following the attack at least 176 suspected members of the group were detained by police.

The attacks in Bauchi were followed the next day by further attacks by Boko Haram on government and security force targets in three other states in northern Nigeria. In the state of Borno, militants attacked the state capital Maiduguri, destroying two police

stations, several churches, a primary school, and a government office in the course of the attack. A prison and a number of police residences were also assaulted by militants during the attack which left 90 militants, eight police officers, two soldiers, and three prison officers dead. Elsewhere in Borno, militants killed a police officer in the Damask area of Mobbar district and burnt down a police headquarters, church, and customs office in the town of Gamboro-Ngala, leaving an unknown number of dead.

The July 2009 uprising also saw violence spread to Yobe State, where a police officer and a civilian were killed by militants in an attack on a police station in the town of Potiskum. Seven other police officers were wounded and two government buildings were also set on fire during the attack. Similarly, in Kano State militants attacked a police station in the town of Wudil, leaving three militants dead and two police officers wounded.

Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf stated on 27 July 2009 that the initial attacks had been launched in response to the detention of nine members of the group in the Biu area of Borno State on 24 July. The men were arrested in possession of explosives and appear to have been plotting an attack. In a seemingly related incident, the following day saw a Boko Haram militant killed when an explosive device he was preparing exploded prematurely in the town of Maiduguri.

In response to the growing violence, the then Nigerian President, Umaru Yar'Adua, ordered security forces to take all necessary actions to quell the uprising. By 28 July 2009, the military had been deployed to the city of Maiduguri in Borno State, the home of Yusuf and center of Boko Haram's activities, and had largely dispersed the militant presence. Yusuf's private residence, as well as the mosque where he preached,

was repeatedly shelled and eventually demolished - causing heavy militant casualties although Yusuf escaped unharmed.

The heavy security force response appeared to have crushed the Boko Haram uprising, especially following the arrest and subsequent death of Yusuf on 30 July 2009. Yusuf was arrested at a family residence in Maiduguri and died in police custody, with police stating that he was shot dead while attempting to escape. However, subsequent speculation based partly on the wounds on his body and the fact that he was still handcuffed at the time of his death, led to accusations that Yusuf had been executed by police officers. Moreover, several police officers were later arrested on charges relating to Yusuf's death, leading to increased reports relating to the alleged indiscriminate use of force by Nigerian security forces in the dispersing of the uprising.

<u>Military</u>

Tactics and Targeting

The initial tactic of Boko Haram was to launch raids against police stations or checkpoints in towns or remote areas. In the first attack by the group in late December 2003 militants attacked and seized control of a town in Yobe State before being forced to withdraw by security forces. In the years following that attack the group has focused on small scale raids and ambushes on police facilities.

The series of attacks launched by Boko Haram on targets in northern Nigeria in July 2009 was generally consistent with this targeting trend, with police stations the primary target of attacks. However, the militants also attacked a prison, government offices, schools, and churches during the course of the uprising.

However, such conventional engagements resulted in Boko Haram suffering heavy casualties and as such from mid-to-late 2010 the group transitioned to carrying out small-arms targeted killings, attacking security force personnel and local officials. In addition, in December Boko Haram began to demonstrate its ability to execute mass-casualty operations. The first concerted use of the tactic came in late December 2010, when Boko Haram militants detonated a series of IEDs at a market in the city of Jos in Plateau State, killing at least 38 civilians. A series of further attacks over the following months saw the group combine the use of IEDs and small-arms in attacks targeting beer gardens near security force facilities in Maiduguri, frequently causing substantial casualties.

The increasing use of mass-casualty tactics was escalated further by Boko Haram in June 2011, when the group carried out the first suicide attack recorded in Nigeria, detonating an SVBIED targeting the police headquarters in the capital Abuja. The group has also demonstrated ability to co-ordinate multiple operations, evidenced by a series of attacks—involving the detonation of an SVBIED and multiple IEDs, as well as several small-arms assaults—on government, security force, and religious targets in the city of Damaturu in Yobe State in early November 2011, killing over 130 people. This trend continued into December 2011, with a suicide bomber attacking the Department of State Security Services' headquarters in Yobe state, killing three personnel and wounding another on 25 December.

Boko Haram has begun increasingly to focus its mass casualty attacks on churches in northern states, notably the St Theresa's Catholic Church in the town of Madalla in Niger State where as many as 40 worshippers were killed on 25 December

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2011. Sporadic attacks against churches and churchgoers, primarily utilizing small arms and IEDs but with the periodic use of SVBIEDs have continued into mid-2012.

In a video statement published on YouTube on 30 September 2012, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau warned that his group would soon launch attacks targeting local and regional leaders in the north of country. He also claimed the group would begin targeting the wives of government officials, in retaliation for the alleged arrests of Boko Haram members' wives.

Throughout 2012, the group increasingly conducted attacks on local Christian communities, seemingly in a bid to exacerbate tensions between Nigeria's Muslim and Christian communities in central and northern Nigeria, who have a long history of communal violence. Frequent targets included churches, clergy, and worshippers. The group was also suspected of conducting attacks against moderate Muslim targets, particularly those known to speak out against the group.

By late 2013 and early 2014, the group notably seemed to focus its operations on schools and students, as well as random civilians. This was underlined by a spate of mass-casualty raids on villages and towns across northern Nigeria during this time, including an attack on a boarding school in the town of Buni Yadi in Yobe State on 25 February, which killed at least 59 people. In the overnight attack, which primarily targeted schoolboys, militants hurled IEDs into residential buildings, sprayed gunfire into rooms, and hacked or burned some students to death. According to teachers at the school, the attackers gathered all the female students together before telling them to go away, get married, and abandon their education.

Weaponry and Equipment

Boko Haram primarily utilizes small-arms weaponry, such as AK-series assault rifles as well as explosive devices in its attacks. In the aftermath of the 2009 July uprising police officials reported that Boko Haram had access to limited heavy weaponry such as general-purpose machine-guns (GPMG) and rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs). Nevertheless, media reports stated that many of the militants killed during the uprising were only armed with machetes.

While the seizure of explosives in July 2009 clearly indicated that Boko Haram had the intent to deploy explosives, the group initially seemed to lack the capability to do so—as evidenced by its failure to carry out explosive attacks during the July 2009 uprising and the death of a bomb maker in Maiduguri while attempting to construct an explosive device.

However, from late 2010 onwards Boko Haram has demonstrated an increasing proficiency in the construction and use of explosives, particularly IEDs, which it has utilized in several mass-casualty operations. This increasing proficiency was demonstrated in mid-2011, with the deployment of several SVBIEDs by the group—a tactic that continued for the remainder of the year, and throughout 2012. While Boko Haram only conducted a few significant explosive device attacks in 2013 - seemingly a trade-off for an increase in raid-style attacks—the group demonstrated that it maintained such capability by a double IED attack at a market in the city of Maiduguri on 2 March 2014 that killed at least 51 people.

Furthermore, an alleged local Boko Haram commander, arrested in Maiduguri in Borno State in February 2011, allegedly claimed during interrogation that the group had access to AK-series assault rifles, RPGs, grenades, and explosive material. On 8 February, three general purpose machine guns, 17 AK-series assault rifles, three Heckler & Koch G3 sniper rifles, one pistol, 20 RPGs along with RPG tubes and chargers, 36 grenades, one teargas rifle, 47 assorted magazines, 11,068 assorted pieces of ammunition, and two vehicles with mounted anti-aircraft stands were among a cache of weapons recovered by security forces following an offensive against the group in Maiduguri, which left 52 militants and two soldiers dead.

## Training and Experience

The majorities of the initial militants in Boko Haram were young middle-class students, many of them from religious schools in northern Nigeria, and as such had little or no training or experience in military affairs. Although the Nigerian government has alleged that the group's militants received training from AQIM and other Al-Qaeda affiliates, there has been no conclusive proof provided of this.

In early September 2009, a suspected member of the group detained during the July uprising alleged that he had spent three months undergoing explosives training in Afghanistan under orders from then Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf. The suspect claimed that his instructions were to then relay what he had learnt to other members of the group when back in Nigeria. However, the suspect was unable to provide any information on where he stayed in Afghanistan or who he was trained by.

The increasing sophistication and proficiency of Boko Haram operations through 2011, most notably the deployment of at least three SVBIEDs has seen repeated

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allegations by Nigerian officials that the group has received training from regional militant Islamist groups. In the aftermath of the August 2011 SVBIED attack on the UN compound in Abuja, security officials alleged that a senior Boko Haram militant, identified as Mamman Nur, had recently returned from training in Somalia with militant Islamist group the Shabab. Such allegations of training links between Boko Haram and other regional militant Islamist groups continued into 2012 with unverified eyewitness reports that several hundred Boko Haram militants had travelled to Mali's Tombouctou region in April to engage in weapons training with Harakat Ansar al-Din militants. However, while credible, such reports remain difficult to independently verify.

An unnamed security source, cited in local media reports on 17 May 2013, claimed that Boko Haram had established a training camp in the Sambisa forest area, located south of Maiduguri in Borno State, near the border with Cameroon.

<div align="center">Personnel and Recruitment</div>

Boko Haram was initially formed by small bands of mainly middle-class young Nigerians, many of whom were local religious students. A meeting between Boko Haram militants and former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo in the city of Maiduguri in Borno State in September 2011 shed further light on the group's membership, with a prominent human rights activist Shehu Sani, who facilitated the meeting, claiming that a number of the group's cadres had been recruited from neighboring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.

<div align="center">Command and Control</div>

There is little open source information available regarding the leadership hierarchy and command and control structure of Boko Haram. The groups multiple

names and aliases and it is unclear how homogenous an entity the group is and whether any individual has overall control of Nigeria's jihadist movement further confuse the situation. Mohammed Yusuf appeared to have occupied such a role, until his death during the July 2009 uprising, and was replaced by current Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in July 2010.

On 24 November 2012, Nigeria's Joint Task Force (JTF) offered large financial rewards in return for information leading to the capture of the Boko Haram leadership. The rewards included up to NGN 50 million (USD 317,000) for the capture of leader Shekau, as well as up to NGN 25 million (USD 158,500) for each of Shekau's four main commanders, who were identified by authorities as Habibu Yusuf (alias Asalafi), Khalid Albarnawai, Momodu Bama (alias Abu Saad), and Mohammed Zangina. The Nigerian military claimed on 14 August 2013 that Momodu Bama had been killed during clashes with the military in the town of Bama in Borno State on 4 August, but the claim could not be independently substantiated.

Rewards of NGN 10 million (USD 63,600) were offered for information leading to the capture of a further seven of the group's senior commanders, who were identified as Abu Saad, Abba Kaka, Abdulmalik Bama, Umar Fulata, Alhaji Mustapha, Massa Ibrahim, and Abubakar Suleiman (alias Khalid). Reports detailing the rewards identified a further eight Boko Haram commanders wanted by the government, although money was not offered for their capture—Hassan Jazair, Ali Jalingo, Alhaji Musa Modu, Bashir Aketa, Abba Goroma—who military officials claimed was killed in a counter-terrorism operation near the city of Maiduguri in Borno State on 18 September 2013—Ibrahim Bashir. Abubakar Zakariya, and Tukur Ahmed Mohammed. On 3 June 2013, the United

States Department of State offered a reward of USD 7 million for information leading to the capture of Shekau as part of its Rewards for Justice Program.

Unverified Nigerian media reports in mid-to-late 2011 have alleged that Boko Haram is split into several factions. According to these reports, the primary faction is led by Abubakar Shekau, with a smaller splinter faction led by senior commander Mamman Nur, whom Nigerian security officials have alleged travelled to Somalia to receive training from militant Islamist group the Shabab. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether reports of such factionalism are credible or whether they are instead indicative of a loose command and control structure within the group.

## The Insurgency Grows Active

The group first became operationally active in late December 2003, when approximately 200 militants attacked several police stations in the northern state of Yobe, near the border with Niger. However, the uprising was quickly dispersed by security forces in the state in early January 2004. The following years saw a series of further abortive uprisings by the group, most notably in July 2009, which began in Bauchi State but quickly spread to the neighboring states of Borno, Kano, and Yobe. During the uprising, the group operated under the name Boko Haram. The uprising ended with Yusuf being captured by police in late July. He subsequently died in police custody later that month, with police claiming that he was shot dead while attempting to escape. However, Boko Haram has claimed that he was executed extra judicially.

## New Leadership

Following Yusuf's death, senior Boko Haram militant Sanni Umaru released a statement in August 2009 in which he assumed leadership of the group and warned of a

renewed armed campaign. Nevertheless, in early July 2010 a video statement was

released by Boko Haram in which Yusuf's deputy, Imam Abubakar bin Mohammed alias

Abubakar Shekau-who had been reported dead in the July 2009 uprising—appeared and

assumed leadership of the group. Shekau has attempted to rebrand the group somewhat,

releasing statements in late 2010 under the name Jama'atu Ahlu-Sunnah Lidda'Awati wal

Jihad, or Group of the Followers of the Prophet for Propagation and Holy Struggle.

Nevertheless, the group remains most often referred to as Boko Haram.

## Economic

### Funding

There is little confirmed information available on funding methods utilized by

Boko Haram, although the Nigerian authorities have made several allegations that the

group has received funds from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other Al-

Qaeda affiliates. However, no conclusive proof has ever been provided of such funding

links.

Across 2011, Boko Haram militants mounted a series of attacks targeting banks in

northern Nigeria, likely representing the group's predominant methods of fundraising.

### Procurement and Supply Lines

Small-arms are relatively easy to procure in Boko Haram's areas of operation and

additional weapons have been stolen from police officers during attacks on police stations

and other security force facilities.

Furthermore, in February 2011 a detained suspected local Boko Haram

commander allegedly claimed during interrogation that the group had smuggled

weaponry—including small-arms and explosives—into Nigeria across the country's border with Chad and Cameroon.

According to a Nigerian military spokesman in late July 2012, a group of suspected Boko Haram militants were caught smuggling small-arms, including AK-series rifles and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, into Nigeria across the border with Chad on 30 July. At least two militants were killed in the ensuing clash, which occurred at the Daban Masara border post near the shores of Lake Chad.

## Social

### Popular Support

The extent of popular support enjoyed by Boko Haram is unknown but cannot be considered large given that the majority of Muslims living in northern Nigeria subscribe to the Sufi branch of Islam—compared to Boko Haram's fundamental Salafist form of Sunni Islam—with a smaller number subscribing to the Shia branch of Islam.

The attacks by Boko Haram on Christian targets in central Nigerian states, such as in Plateau State in December 2010, may represent an attempt by the group to generate increased popular support by participating in the existing religious (communal) violence that has plagued areas where the predominantly Muslim-dominated north meets the predominantly Christian-dominated south. However, it is unclear whether the group can expect to generate substantial support in this manner.

## Organizational Infrastructure

### Formation

Boko Haram represents the latest iteration in Nigerian militant Islamism. While it is clear that common threads of membership and doctrine have existed between

successive militant Islamist groups in Nigeria, the extent to which such groups are networked and organized is uncertain. Nigeria has seen several militant Islamist groups since achieving independence in 1960, the first such being the Maitatsine in the 1970s. It was initially formed by Abubakar Lawan in 1995 and was made up of small bands of mainly young, middle-class Nigerians in the northern, Muslim-dominated states of Nigeria. Leadership was taken over in 2003 by Mohammed Yusuf, a young cleric who was chosen by a shura, or council of scholars, in the group. Later in 2003, Yusuf revolted against the scholars within the group and ousted them from the organization, claiming that they had become corrupt and were not preaching pure Islam.

## Alliances and Rivalries

Nigerian authorities have accused Boko Haram of having links to AQIM or other Al-Qaeda affiliates, with such ties allegedly covering the provision of funds and training. However, in its Country Report on Terrorism 2007, the US Department of State argued that "no conclusive links have been definitively proven" between Boko Haram and AQIM in Mali or Al-Qaeda affiliates elsewhere.

Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau responded in September in a statement released via AQIM's Al-Andalus media branch. In the statement, Shekau called on Muslims to unite to fight their oppressors everywhere and gave an extensive justification for the use of violence in the pursuit of establishing the rule of Sharia. Shekau also paid his respects to Droukdel and senior Shabab commander Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Ali alias Abu Mansur, who Shekau incorrectly referred to as the emir of the Islamic State of Somalia. Nevertheless, the statement contained no confirmation of definitive links between Boko Haram and other regional militant Islamist groups.

Allegations of links between Boko Haram and AQIM continued to be made into 2011. Unnamed Nigerian security officials claimed in May that there was evidence that AQIM had provided some funding to Boko Haram and that some members of the group had been trained at camps outside of Nigeria, although no evidence was made public. Although such links remain difficult to independently verify, the Nigerien Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Bazoum, alleged on 24 January that Boko Haram militants were thought to have received explosives training from AQIM militants in North Africa's Sahel region.

In addition, Nigerian security officials claimed in August 2011 that senior Boko Haram militant Mumman Nur had travelled to Somalia and had trained with the Shabab before returning to Nigeria to plan attacks. The following month the head of the US' Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Carter Ham, stated that in his opinion Boko Haram's links to the Shabab, while feasible, were "more idealistic than realistic at this point."

Splits, Fractures, and Subgroup Expansion

The birth of Ansaru—A splinter group, identifying itself as Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, or Partisans of Muslims in Black Africa, released a statement in late January 2012 in which it announced its separation from Boko Haram under the purported leadership of Abu Usamatu Al-Ansari. The statement indicated that the purported splinter had emerged due to disagreements with certain Boko Haram tactics. Ansaru expanded on these disagreements in a 4 June video in which he claimed his group would abide by three objectives he insisted Boko Haram had failed to do: to not kill innocent Muslims, except in "self-defense;" to not kill "innocent security operatives" unless they attack his

fighters; and to strive to defend Islamic interests and Muslims throughout all of Africa, not solely in Nigeria. Following its establishment, Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, more popularly known as Ansaru, claimed responsibility for several attacks in Nigeria, including the killing of two police officers during an attack on a prison outside Abuja on 26 November—during which at least 30 prisoners escaped. A group of Ansaru militants also attacked a residential compound and kidnapped a French national, identified as Francis Collomp, working for the energy firm Vergnet in the town of Rimi, close to the border with Niger, in Nigeria's Katsina state on 19 December. While group's killing of two soldiers travelling in Kogi State towards Mali on 19 January 2013 gained it international attention, the group assumed international prominence on 16 February when its fighters kidnapped seven foreign nationals—including one Italian national, one Greek national, one Filipino national, and at least two Lebanese nationals—during an attack on a compound of Lebanese construction company Setraco Nigeria Limited in the town of Jamaare in Bauchi State. On 4 June 2013, President Jonathan formally declared the group as a terrorist organization.

Information

Information Campaigns

Following Boko Haram's emergence in 2003 the group did not have a formal media outlet, instead releasing statements via a spokesman identified as Aminu Tashen-Ilimi. However, this name is an alias meaning a "new way of knowledge" and the identity of Tashen-Ilimi remains unclear.

Following the July 2009 uprising, a number of spokesmen have emerged and released statements to the media on behalf of Boko Haram, such as Musa Tanko, Abu Zaid, and Abu Qaqa. The true identity of these various spokesmen remains unclear.

Boko Haram has also periodically released videos featuring the leader of the group. The first such video emerged in August 2009 with new Boko Haram leader Sanni Umaru assuming control of the group following the death of Mohammed Yusuf the previous month. This was followed by the release of a video statement by senior Boko Haram commander Abubakar Shekau in July 2010 in which he announced his leadership of the group.

In addition, to releasing statements directly to the media, Boko Haram has also released communiqués via AQIM's Al-Andalus media branch and released an audio statement via the Ansar al-Mujahideen jihadist internet forum.

While the statements released by Boko Haram are typically in the Hausa dialect, likely indicating an intended local audience, since late 2010 the group has released several statements in Arabic, potentially indicating a desire for a wider audience in the Arabic-speaking world. Illustrating this further was a video released on 29 November 2012 in which Shekau again spoke in Arabic and devoted part of the video to saluting Islamist militants around the world.

<u>Controlled Territory</u>

Boko Haram was initially active in the remote northeastern region of Nigeria. In particular, the group's operations were concentrated in Yobe State on the border with Niger, and Borno State on the border with Chad and Cameroon. Subsequent renewed

militant Islamist activity was concentrated in Kano State and during the 2007 uprising Nigerian authorities made arrests in Yobe, Kano, and Kaduna State (south of Kano).

During the July 2009 uprising, Boko Haram carried out operations in the states of Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, and Kano. The group's operational activity was based around the city of Maiduguri, capital of Borno State, where then leader Mohammed Yusuf maintained a compound until it was discovered and captured by security forces during the July 2009 uprising.

There have also been unconfirmed reports that Boko Haram has a presence in more central states, such as Plateau. This was seemingly confirmed in December 2010 when the group claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in the city of Jos, Plateau, which left at least 38 civilians dead. Boko Haram was also linked to a bomb attack in the capital Abuja in late December 2010 by President Goodluck Jonathan. The group's operational presence in the capital was confirmed in mid-2011, when the group claimed responsibility for two separate suicide attacks in Abuja in June and August.

Following a large-scale police and army offensive announced by the Ministry of Defense on 15 May 2013 targeting Boko Haram militants in the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded both an increase in suspected Boko Haram activity as well as counter-terrorism operations targeting the group outside its traditional operating areas. Indeed, on 10 August army forces raided a suspected Boko Haram hideout in the city of Sokoto in Sokoto State, arresting several suspected militants.

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